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SUPREME SILENCE AND PRECEDENTIAL 
PRAGMATISM: 
KING V. BURWELL AND STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION IN THE FEDERAL 
COURTS OF APPEALS 
MICHAEL J. CEDRONE* 
This Article studies statutory interpretation as it is practiced in the federal 
courts of appeal.  Much of the academic commentary in this field focuses on the 
Supreme Court, which skews the debate and unduly polarizes the field.  This 
Article investigates more broadly by looking at the seventy-two federal 
appellate cases that cite King v. Burwell in the two years after the Court issued 
its decision.  In deciding that the words “established by the State” encompass 
a federal program, the Court in King reached a pragmatic and practical result 
based on statutory scheme and purpose at a fairly high level of generality.  
Cases that cite King might be expected to accept or reject this kind of purpose 
move, and to generally be more attentive to matters of interpretation. 
The results presented here reveal a dynamic landscape in which federal 
appeals courts seem relatively uncommitted to ideological battles over 
interpretive principles, notwithstanding the relatively small number of opinions 
that contain rhetorical flourishes in this area.  Courts freely pursue the best 
reading of statutory text through textual and purposive means: linguistic 
analysis of the words, contextual readings of multiple statutory provisions and 
analysis of the statutory scheme, and evidence of purpose gleaned from textual 
and extra-textual sources.  While not pervasive, legislative history commonly 
guides interpretation.  These results hold across cases where text and purpose 
conflict and where text and purpose are in harmony.  In cases of conflict, the 
results also hold across cases that reach results primarily based on text and 
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cases that reach results based primarily on purpose.  Further, given the 
opportunity to weigh in on lower court statutory construction debates, the 
Supreme Court has remained silent.  This Article concludes that it is 
normatively desirable that lower federal courts have not embraced the statutory 
construction battles in an all-encompassing way.  The Article concludes with 
the caveat that this research should be revisited to assess the effect of Donald 
Trump’s appointments to the judiciary. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Statutory interpretation has been an intractable focus of contention for a 
very long time because the debate about the proper result in any particular case 
can be a proxy for underlying assumptions about ways of reading language and 
the proper role of the courts in the United States legal system.1  The stakes are 
high: statutory issues pervade the federal courts: nearly two-thirds of the 
Supreme Court’s recent docket focuses on the meanings of federal statutes, and 
statutory issues abound in the lower federal courts as well.2  While statutory 
interpretation is often simplified into a text-vs.-purpose zero-sum tug-of-war, 
this view posits a false dichotomy: the actual landscape is considerably more 
complex and nuanced.  
Textualists have been ascendant at the Supreme Court for decades and that 
their influence has been felt throughout the federal judiciary and academia.3  
However, few judicial or academic interpreters are textual exclusivists.4  Most 
judges and theorists agree that purpose is a relevant consideration, though they 
differ about how much to consider the purpose when purpose and text are in 
tension—and even when they are not.5  Further, they also disagree about what 
evidence of statutory purpose is legitimate.6  Some look for purpose primarily 
in the text and structure of the statute as a whole, while others would admit 
legislative history as evidence of legislative purpose.7  These debates over the 
proper role of purpose and the legitimate evidence of purpose are where much 
of the real debate lies. 
 
1. Compare ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS 5 (2012) (arguing that the notion that judges invented the common law over time has 
“stretched into a belief that judges ‘make’ law through judicial interpretation of democratically enacted 
statutes”), with ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 10 (2014) (arguing that courts should 
“[r]espect[] Congress’s work product” so that “courts will interpret the law in a manner consistent with 
legislative purposes” and “Congress will perceive the courts as productive partners rather than as 
meddlers substituting their own preferences for that of the legislative branch”). 
2. KATZMANN, supra note 1, at 3, 122 n.1. 
3. See generally Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118 
(2016) (describing a textualist method of statutory interpretation). 
4. See John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 115. 
5. See id.; Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (2006). 
6. See Molot, supra note 5, at 2. 
7. See id. 
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Both of these dilemmas were presented to the Supreme Court in King v. 
Burwell,8 which presents the strongest purposive result reached by the Court in 
decades.  In King, the Court held that the words “established by the State,” used 
in the Affordable Care Act,9 encompassed a program established by the federal 
government.10  Reaching this holding required the Court to sidestep the textual 
meaning of “established by the State.”11  Instead, the Court relied on the 
structure of the Act as a whole and on legislative purpose at a fairly broad level 
of generality.12  As Chief Justice John Roberts declared in his opinion for a 6-3 
majority, “Congress passed the Affordable Care Act to improve health 
insurance markets, not to destroy them.”13  Notably, the Court did not 
meaningfully rely on legislative history in reaching this conclusion.14  
The result in King is unusual for a Court with a majority of textualists; 
indeed, it has been termed “one of the most interesting statutory interpretation 
cases in recent years” by now-Justice Brett Kavanaugh.15  The case seems a 
vivid demonstration that purpose is not dead, nor is it on life support, and that 
purpose still has outcome-determinative effect in at least some difficult and 
consequential cases where the language of particular provisions seems at odds 
with the statutory purpose and scheme. 
Academic discussion of statutory interpretation has tended to focus on the 
Supreme Court to the exclusion of other tribunals.16  This state of affairs leads 
the academy to focus overly on the statements and commitments of Members 
of the Court and not to focus on the business of judging as it is practiced in 
courts with substantial impact on the lives of many Americans.17  There is some 
 
8. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
9. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 18001−121 (2010). 
10. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2494–95.  The federal exchange is established under the statute for states 
that elect not to set up and manage their own exchanges.  Id. at 2494. 
11. Id. at 2495. 
12. Id. at 2494–95. 
13. Id. at 2496. 
14. See id. at 2492–96. 
15. Kavanaugh, supra note 3, at 2158–59.  Then-future-Justice Kavanaugh said it was “not [his] 
place to say whether King v. Burwell was right or wrong in its outcome,” but he said that the question 
would depend on whether courts could “look at the overall Act and adopt what they [i.e. courts] 
conclude Congress meant rather than what Congress said.”  Id. 
16. See Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: A Survey of 
Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1298, 1300 (2018) (“[T]he 
Supreme Court’s practice has received nearly all of the attention from academics and practitioners.”). 
17. See id. at 1300−01. 
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indication that this situation is beginning to change.  Prof. Abbe Gluck has 
studied state court statutory interpretation,18 and she and Judge Richard Posner 
recently surveyed the statutory interpretation views of judges on the federal 
courts of appeal.19  
This Article furthers the study of lower federal court statutory interpretation 
through a different approach.  It reviews the seventy-two federal court of 
appeals decisions that cite King v. Burwell during the two-year period following 
its issuance.  The selection of King as a starting point is intentional.  While 
perhaps not representative of the entire corpus of federal statutory interpretation 
jurisprudence, the seventy-two cases that cite King are likeliest to embrace (or 
strongly reject) the kind of purposive moves made by the Supreme Court in 
King.  They are also somewhat more likely to contain an explicit discussion of 
interpretive method.  Finally, two years’ worth of cases generates a sample 
sufficiently large to obscure the effect of outliers and permit some tentative 
observations to be reached. 
The results of this study reveal a dynamic landscape in which courts seem 
relatively uncommitted to ideological battles over interpretive principles, 
notwithstanding a relatively small number of opinions which contain rhetorical 
flourishes in this area.20  Courts freely pursue the best reading of statutory text 
through textual and purposive means: linguistic analysis of the words, 
contextual readings of multiple statutory provisions and analysis of the 
statutory scheme, and evidence of purpose gleaned from textual and extra-
textual sources.21  While not pervasive, legislative history appears commonly 
in these cases.22 
This study divides the cases based upon whether text and purpose appear to 
be in tension or harmony.  Throughout all categories, there are numerous 
 
18. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological 
Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1761–70 (2010). 
19. See Gluck & Posner, supra note 16, at 1300. 
20. See infra Part III. 
21. See infra Part III. 
22. See, e.g., Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 840 F.3d 879, 884 
(7th Cir. 2016); In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litig., 818 F.3d 98, 118 (2d Cir. 2016); 
United States v. Epskamp, 832 F.3d 154, 165 (2d Cir. 2016); Hernandez v. Williams, 829 F.3d 1068, 
1078 (9th Cir. 2016); G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist., 802 F.3d 601, 621 (3d Cir. 2015); In re Google 
Inc. Cookie Placement & Consumer Privacy Litig., 806 F.3d 125, 147 (3d Cir. 2015); see also infra 
note 415.  
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examples of courts pursuing the best result through text and purpose, using a 
wide range of evidence, including legislative history.23 
Cases where text and purpose appear to be in tension or at odds require that 
courts decide when and whether to consider purpose and what kind of evidence 
or purpose to admit.24  In these cases, courts are attuned to the relative clarity 
of the text and the relation between the apparent plain meaning of the text and 
the apparent purpose of the provision within the statute as a whole.25  Some 
sixteen cases in the set use purpose to resolve questions on which statutory text 
is silent, internally conflicted, or at odds with the court’s view of purpose.26  
These cases depend on a wide array of evidence and arguments.27  Most cite 
legislative history.28  Nine cases in which text and purpose are in tension reject 
purposive readings and stick with text in the face of arguments that text and 
purpose conflict.29  A few of these cases contain language that explicitly 
questions the legitimacy of purposive interpretation or the use of extra-textual 
evidence.30  Yet, a large number of these cases also cite legislative history.31  In 
twenty-two cases, text and purpose appear not to be at odds.32  In those cases, 
courts freely consult context, statutory structure and scheme, statutory purpose 
to confirm their readings of text.33  Legislative history is cited in five of these 
cases.34  
Moreover, given an opportunity to weigh into the statutory construction 
wars explicitly and in a way that could (at least in theory) control the lower 
federal courts, the Supreme Court has refused to do so.35  Thus, for the 
foreseeable future, the courts of appeal are likely to continue taking an eclectic 
 
23. See infra Section III.B.  
24. See infra Part III.  
25. See infra Part III. 
26. See infra note 259.  
27. See infra Section III.B.  
28. See supra note 22. 
29. See infra Section III.C.  
30. See infra Section III.C.2. 
31. See, e.g., In re Settoon Towing, L.L.C., 859 F.3d 340, 352 (5th Cir. 2017); Pakootas v. Teck 
Cominco Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d 975, 985 (9th Cir. 2016); In re Schwartz-Tallard, 803 F.3d 1095, 1100 
(9th Cir. 2015).   
32. See infra Section III.D. 
33. See infra Section III.D. 
34. See infra note 412 and accompanying text. 
35. See infra Part IV.  
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approach, although it will be important to return to this research to consider the 
impact of judges appointed by Donald Trump. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II briefly surveys the landscape of 
academic discussion surrounding statutory interpretation.36  It summarizes 
differences in method and basic jurisprudential philosophy between New 
Textualist and purposive schools of interpretation, ultimately concluding that 
the differences are quite narrow.37  Part III summarizes the issues raised by King 
v. Burwell and assesses the textual and purposive moves in the case.38  
Ultimately, it concludes that King demonstrates the sort of pragmatic approach 
to interpretation that is common in the lower courts.39  Part IV discusses court 
of appeals cases that cite King in the two years following its issuance.40  
Following a note about the method of this study, this Part divides the cases into 
three categories: cases that embrace purposive readings of text, cases that rely 
on a textual approach, and cases where text and purpose do not conflict.41  Most 
courts across these categories take a pragmatic, encompassing approach to 
statutes, considering text and purpose, and in a substantial number of cases, 
looking to legislative history for guidance.  Part V considers the significance of 
two cases where courts of appeals reached strongly purposive results only to be 
overturned by the Supreme Court in opinions that do not mandate a narrow 
textualist approach to interpretation.42  In view of these developments, the paper 
concludes that pragmatism is likely to continue as the order of the day in the 
lower courts, thought the impact of judges appointed by Donald Trump will 
have to be assessed through further study.43 
II. DO THEORIES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION MATTER?  
The legal community has long weighed the question of how a court should 
treat enacted legislative text when it is called on to decide meaning.  For a court 
 
36. See infra Part II. 
37. See infra Part II. 
38. See infra Part III. 
39. See infra Part III. 
40. See infra Part IV. 
41. See infra Part IV. 
42. See infra Part V. 
43. See infra Part VI. 
 
CEDRONE_FINAL_03DEC19 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/3/2019  7:50 PM 
50 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [103:43 
 
 
trying to interpret or construe44 legislation, the three canonical starting points 
have been statutory text, statutory purpose, and legislative intent.45  
These three starting points have spawned a vast, fascinating commentary. 
Scholars have proffered numerous theories of statutory interpretation.46  Judges, 
on the front lines of statutory interpretation wars, have also produced articulate 
and eloquent justifications for various positions.47  In the past twenty or so 
years, looking principally to the Supreme Court, the two main approaches to 
interpretation have been the “New Textualism” championed by Justice Antonin 
Scalia and others,48 and a modern approach to Purposivism, which has been 
 
44. For a discussion of the differences between interpretation and construction, see Lawrence B. 
Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 100–08 (2010) (“As I 
discuss the distinction, I will use constitutional interpretation and construction in an illustrative context, 
but the distinction itself applies whenever an authoritative legal text is applied or explicated.”).  On 
Solum’s account of the distinction, interpretation is an attempt to ascertain linguistic meaning while 
construction is the process of assigning legal effect to the semantic content of an authoritative legal 
text.  Id. at 100, 103.  For purposes of this article, I will use the term “statutory interpretation,” 
recognizing that this process often involves both interpretation and construction, particularly in cases 
where interpretation is insufficient to decide the matter in question because of linguistic ambiguity or 
conflict among particular statutory provisions. 
45. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical 
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 321–22 n.2 (1990) (referring to intent, purpose, and text as 
“foundational” approaches, and identifying such an approach in pure form as “a theory that identifies 
a single primary legitimate source of interpretation . . . and adheres to the statutory meaning that source 
suggests, regardless of circumstances or consequences”). 
46. Scholarly commentary in this area is vast.  For a general overview and commentary, see 
generally WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION (1999); Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 45, at 324–45.  A “Brief Overview of the 
Mainstream Debates” may be found in Gluck, supra note 18, at 1761–70. 
47. For the work of judges, compare Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law 
System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A 
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS. & THE LAW 3, 3 (Amy Guttman Ed., 1997) 
(espousing a textualist perspective), with STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR 
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 17–18 (2005) (advocating a purposive approach), and KATZMANN, 
supra note 1, at 31 (“[T]he fundamental task . . . is to interpret language in light of the statute’s 
purpose(s) as enacted by legislators, with particular attention to those legislative materials that reliably 
contribute to understanding the statute’s meaning.”); see also Richard A. Posner, Statutory 
Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 817–18 (1983) 
(imaginative reconstruction); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 286–
90 (1985).  
48. See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 15–16; William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New 
Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623 (1990). 
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described as “textually constrained,”49 and is most prominently espoused by 
Justice Breyer.50   
A brief description of these differences sets the stage for the issues that 
dominate King v. Burwell and its progeny.  Each philosophy has its own 
methods of interpretation, preferred evidence, and underlying assumptions.  
Understanding the context of the New Textualism and modern Purposivism 
permits a judgment to be made about King v. Burwell’s true legacy and the 
effects it may have in the lower federal courts. 
A. The New Textualism 
The New Textualism, associated primarily with Justices Antonin Scalia and 
Clarence Thomas, has been ascendant at the Supreme Court of the United States 
for the better part of the last twenty-five years.51  Justice Scalia has identified 
the object of interpretation as looking for “‘objectified’ intent—the intent that 
a reasonable person would gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the 
remainder of the corpus juris.”52  Scalia derides the search for legislative intent 
from extra-textual sources as undemocratic, a process that provides “handy 
cover for judicial intent.”53  Scalia consequently concludes that “[t]he text is the 
law, and it is the text that must be observed.”54 
This elevation of text has important ramifications for the kinds of evidence 
a court may accept to determine what the law is.  The tools of textualism are 
 
49. Manning, supra note 4, at 118–19 (arguing that even the Supreme Court’s nontextualist 
members “rely on the text to structure and constrain their use of purpose”); Gluck, supra note 18, at 
1764–65 (“[T]extualism has had a significant impact across the spectrum, leading ‘even nonadherents 
to give great weight to statutory text.’”). 
50. Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 
SUP. CT. REV. 51, 86 (referring to Justice Breyer, along with Justice Stevens, as the Court’s “most 
committed purposivists”); Manning, supra note 4, at 128 (identifying Justices Breyer and Stevens as 
“the Court’s strongest purposivists”). 
51. Manning, supra note 4, at 114 (“While one can point to the rare exception, the Court in the 
last two decades has mostly treated as uncontroversial its duty to adhere strictly to the terms of a clear 
statutory text, even when doing so produces results that fit poorly with the apparent purposes that 
inspired the enactment.”) (citation omitted). 
52. Scalia, supra note 47, at 17. 
53. Id. at 17–18; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword to SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, 
at xxii–xxiii. 
54. Scalia, supra note 47, at 22. 
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well-known: a textualist judge will consult dictionaries,55 textual context,56 and 
canons of construction, which are linguistic presumptions about legislation’s 
meaning.57  
Beyond use of these tools, there are two additional defining features of 
modern textualism: substantial limitations on the use of purpose, and a rejection 
of legislative history as a legitimate source of meaning.58  Textualist judges will 
make reference to the purpose of the statute in a limited way.59  Purpose must 
be derived from the text of the statute,60 that is, from “concrete manifestations 
as deduced from close reading of the text.”61  On this view, purpose may not be 
 
55. Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier & Samuel A. Thumma, Scaling the Lexicon Fortress: The United 
States Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries in the Twenty-First Century, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 77, 86 
(2010) (charting an increase in dictionary use in Court opinions from the 1970s to the 1980s and the 
1980s to the 1990s, but finding a flattening of the rate of use in the first decade of the 2000s); see also 
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 69–77 (describing and defending use of dictionaries as part of the 
“Ordinary-Meaning Canon”); id. at 415–24 (Appendix A: A Note on the Use of Dictionaries). 
56. Gluck, supra note 18, at 1763 n.37 (“‘Context’ generally refers to how the contested term 
fits into the statutory scheme as a whole—e.g., how it is used in other statutes, or later in the same 
statute.”). 
57. Scalia, supra note 47, at 25–29; SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 53–411 (describing 
canons of construction in great detail).  To be sure, reliance on canons has not gone unchallenged, 
dating back to the 1950s, when Karl Llewellyn declared “there are two opposing canons on almost 
every point.”  Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or 
Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950).  Not surprisingly, 
Justice Scalia has rejected Llewellyn’s attack on multiple occasions. Scalia, supra note 47, at 26–27; 
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 59–62 (rejecting Llewellyn and defending the use of canons).  A 
more recent and substantial attack on the canons comes from Professors Bressman and Gluck, whose 
empirical work suggests that many canons of construction are not well-known among legislative 
drafters working for the United States Congress.  Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory 
Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the 
Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725, 728 (2014); Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory 
Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the 
Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 926 (2013). 
58. Manning, supra note 4, at 123–24 (defining the rejection of legislative history as a source of 
meaning and the rejection of purpose to trump clear text as the “two major components” of “the new 
textualism”); Gluck, supra note 18, at 1765 (“A judge who acknowledges the importance of text but 
still takes various positions from case to case regarding whether text trumps other interpretive tools is 
not a textualist.”).  
59. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015).  See, e.g., In re Wright, 826 F.3d 774, 779, 
782–83 (4th Cir. 2016); Zero Zone, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Energy, 832 F.3d 654, 689 n.41 (7th Cir. 
2016). 
60. See discussion supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.   
61. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 20. 
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used to “contradict text or to supplement it”; to do so would disrespect the 
democratic compromise encapsulated in the legislative text.62  
Further, when textualists rely on purpose, they require that it be “defined 
precisely” and “described . . . concretely.”63  At a broad enough level of 
generality, any result could be sustained, regardless of text.  The textualist 
interpreter will generally limit her consideration to the specific purposes of the 
particular provision at issue, seen in the context of the structure and language 
of the statute as a whole.64  As an evidentiary matter, textually defined purpose 
does not admit evidence beyond plain meaning, statutory structure, context, and 
canons.65  Instead, it relies on text and textual context to be used to better define 
and understand the language of particular provisions.66  
Most prominently, textualism rejects legislative history and other extrinsic 
sources (such as “assumptions about the legal drafter’s desires”) as evidence of 
purpose.67  Textualists reject legislative history because they harbor deep 
skepticism about whether statements contained in legislative history actually 
reflect the will of the enacting majority and because they consider it illegitimate 
to grant legislative history the same authoritative status as duly enacted 
statutory text.68 
 
62. Id. at 57 (“[T]he limitations of a text—what a text chooses not to do—are as much a part of 
its ‘purpose’ as its affirmative dispositions.”). 
63. Id. at 56–57. 
64. Id. at 167. 
65. Id. at 53–76, 156–60.  
66. Id.  
67. Scalia, supra note 47, at 29–37; SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 56; see also Manning, 
supra note 4, at 123–24.  There is some irony here.  The canons of construction are quite obviously 
extrinsic to statutory text, and recent work discussed above (Gluck and Bressman articles) suggests 
they are not universally known among legislative drafters, but they are admitted as legitimate evidence 
of meaning by textualists while legislative history is not.   
68. Manning, supra note 4, at 123–24.  This skepticism has been noted to be an outgrowth of 
public choice view of the legislative process, which holds that because “legislation is a product of 
compromises among groups, . . . attributing a purpose to a statute either may improperly privilege the 
interests of one group over another (thereby undermining the bargain) or may impute a purpose where 
none (other than the desire to reach agreement) existed.”  T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory 
Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 28 (1988).  The literature here is vast: representative cites must 
suffice.  Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547–48 (1983); Kenneth 
A. Shepsle, Congress is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & 
ECON. 239, 244–45 (1992). 
 
CEDRONE_FINAL_03DEC19 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/3/2019  7:50 PM 
54 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [103:43 
 
 
The jurisprudential philosophy of textualists is rooted in realist institutional 
views about the work of Congress and the proper role of courts.69  Textualists’ 
vision of Congress’ work is at once encompassing and skeptical.  It is 
encompassing in that textualists seek to vindicate legislative supremacy by 
respecting Congress’ power to define rules of law (through its enacted text) that 
bind all other governmental actors, including judges.70  It is skeptical in that 
textualists do not trust efforts to understand Congressional intent from any 
source other than enacted text.71 
The implication of textualism for judges is a much more limited role.  By 
valorizing text and rejecting legislative history, textualists seek to cabin judicial 
discretion: judges are to “interpret” and not “make” law.72  The view reflects “a 
new appreciation of the judiciary’s limited role in the constitutional structure 
and of the dangers of judicial self-aggrandizement.”73  As such, judges are 
“agent[s]” and not “partners[]” of the legislature when they interpret statutes, 
and must defer to duly enacted Congressional pronouncements with only a 
limited role for judicial discretion.74 
B. Textually Constrained Purposivism 
For all the influence that textualism has had in recent decades, purposive 
interpretation is still an important part of the modern landscape, as King v. 
Burwell itself illustrates.75  The archetypical case illustrating a strong purposive 
approach—dating from 1892—is Holy Trinity Church v. United States.76  In 
Holy Trinity, the Supreme Court had to decide whether a statute that forbade 
anyone from “in any manner whatsoever, to prepay the transportation, or in any 
 
69. Molot, supra note 5, at 25 (“Textualism’s core interpretive theory found its origins in legal 
realism.”). 
70. Earl M. Maltz, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Power: The Case for a Modified 
Intentionalist Approach, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1, 7–9 (1988). 
71. See Molot, supra note 5, at 26–29; see also Manning, supra note 4, at 123–24. 
72. Gluck, supra note 18, at 1763; see also Molot, supra note 5, at 26–29 (describing 
textualism’s affinity with Erie and Chevron doctrines as reflecting “both a realist appreciation of the 
leeway inherent in interpretation and a formalist aspiration to cabin that leeway.”). 
73. Molot, supra note 5, at 29. 
74. EVA H. HANKS, MICHAEL E. HERZ, & STEVEN S. NEMERSON, ELEMENTS OF LAW 253–54 
(2d ed. 2010). 
75. Abbe R. Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding Congress’ Plan in the 
Era of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62, 81 (2015) (observing that King v. Burwell is 
decided using “objectified, text-derived purpose”).  
76. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).  
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way assist or encourage the importation or migration” of an “alien” or 
“foreigner” into the United States under contract “to perform labor or service 
of any kind” applied to the Rev. E. Walpole Warren, called in 1887 from the 
United Kingdom to the rectorship of Holy Trinity Church in New York City.77 
The Court’s crucial move in Holy Trinity divorced legal effect from the 
semantic meaning of the text; put differently, the Court used purpose to trump 
text.78  While acknowledging that the contract between the church and Warren 
was indeed “within the letter of this section,” the Court nonetheless held that 
the contract did not violate the statute because it was “not within its spirit nor 
within the intention of its makers.”79  Along the way, the Court observed that 
the purpose of the statute was to keep “cheap unskilled labor” out of the 
country80 and that, as legislature of a “Christian nation,” the Congress can 
hardly have seriously intended to prevent the entry of a minister.81  In reaching 
this conclusion, the Court analyzed “the title of the act, the evil which was 
intended to be remedied, the circumstances surrounding the appeal to Congress, 
[and] the reports of the committee of each house.”82  Indeed, the Court quotes 
legislative history from both the Senate and House of Representatives in 
support of its view of the legislative purpose.83 
The holding in Holy Trinity is a high-water mark for the use of purpose.  In 
the face of clear text, the Court departed from the semantic meaning of the 
words in order to effectuate what it considered to be the Congressional purpose 
 
77. Id. at 457–58.  
78. Id. at 458–59.  
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 465. 
81. Id. at 471.  The Court noted that the statute contained specific exceptions for “professional 
actors, artists, lecturers, singers, and domestic servants,” but was not troubled by the lack of a textual 
exception for ministers.  Id. at 458–59.  It is tempting to deconstruct the Court’s assumptions about 
“unskilled laborers” and the character of the United States as a “Christian nation” in 1892, id. at 471, 
but those temptations do not further the ends of this article and are best addressed separately. 
82. Id. at 465. 
83. Id. at 464–65. 
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of the statute.84  There has been much commentary about this decision,85 but 
there is little doubt that this approach has profoundly influenced courts in the 
United States, in particular after the New Deal.86  In United States v. American 
Trucking Associations Inc., the Court observed that when plain meaning 
produced an “unreasonable” result “plainly at variance with the policy of the 
legislation as a whole,” the Court would “follow[] that purpose, rather than the 
literal words.”87  The scope of purpose, and consequently the power of the 
Court, is quite broad: on this view, the Court will disregard text not only when 
the result is absurd (a modest claim even embraced to some extent by milder 
schools of textualism), but the Court will cast text aside when it is merely 
unreasonable.88 
Modern purposivists rarely go so far.  As discussed further below, modern 
purposivism is perhaps best described as “textually constrained.”89  In many 
ways, this is the result of the New Textualism.90  It is not uncommon to read 
cases from the Supreme Court, lower federal courts, and state courts from 
judges of all stripes that pronounce: where the language of the statute is clear, 
that is the end of the matter.91 
As to the question of legislative history, modern textualists are also 
cautious. In her confirmation hearings, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg described 
her own attitude when consulting legislative history as one of “hopeful 
 
84. In more complete historical accounts, academics have differentiated between intentionalism 
and purposivism.  See JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND 
REGULATION 19–20 (2010) (differentiating “intentionalism” as the attempt to focus on the legislative 
intent of a specific provision from “purposivism” as taking account of general statutory purposes); 
HANKS, HERZ, & NEMERSON, supra note 74, at 264 (using intent to refer to “what the legislature meant, 
the specific understanding it had in mind” and purpose to refer to “what it is the legislature ultimately 
sought to accomplish”).  Because the current sketch is intended only to set the stage for a discussion 
of modern approaches to statutes, this distinction does not figure prominently in the discussion above. 
85. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 47, at 18–23; Manning, supra note 4, at 122. 
86. Manning, supra note 4, at 122 (purposivism “reached its apogee after the New Deal”). 
87. 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940) (quoting Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 194 (1922)).  
88. See Manning, supra note 4, at 129–30. 
89. Id. at 118; see infra notes 109–12 and accompanying text.  
90. See Manning, supra note 4, at 146–47. 
91. See Manning, supra note 4, at 125–30 n.66–86 (citing example cases from the Supreme 
Court); see also KATZMANN, supra note 1, at 29 (“When statutes are unambiguous, . . . the inquiry for 
a court generally ends with an examination of the words of the statute.”); Gluck, supra note 18, at 
1819. 
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skepticism.”92  More recently, Chief Judge Robert Katzmann of the Second 
Circuit has penned a brief but influential book entitled Judging Statutes, which 
argues in favor of courts consulting “authoritative” and “reliabl[e]” legislative 
history.93  Katzmann argues for treating different forms of legislative history 
differently.94  At the top of the paradigm are committee reports, which “have 
long been important means of informing the whole chamber about proposed 
legislation” and are “often the primary means by which staffs brief their 
principals before voting on a bill.”95  The views of Justice Ginsburg and Chief 
Judge Katzmann demonstrate a sound basis for careful, educated use of 
legislative history in purposive statutory interpretation.96 
The jurisprudential view of purposivists sways between the idea that courts 
must be faithful agents of Congress when they interpret statutes and the idea 
that courts partner with Congress to effect the intended statutory purpose.97  
Judge Katzmann’s book reflects this tension.98  He believes that “the role of the 
courts is to interpret the law in a way that is faithful to its meaning . . . not to 
 
92. Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, To Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 224 (1993). 
93. KATZMANN, supra note 1, at 29, 31.  For a thoughtful and sympathetic review, see John F. 
Manning, Why Does Congress Vote on Some Texts But Not Others?, 51 TULSA L. REV. 559, 559 (2016) 
(calling Judging Statutes a “great book”). 
94. KATZMANN, supra note 1, at 29. 
95. Id. at 19.  Katzmann recognizes that careful and modest use of legislative history requires 
courts to know more about the workings of Congress so they can better differentiate various types of 
Congressional work-product.  Id. at 22.  In support of this view, Judge Katzmann points to an influential 
empirical study by Abbe Gluck and Lisa Schultz Bressman that finds that “legislative history was 
emphatically viewed by almost all of our respondents—Republicans and Democrats, majority and 
minority, alike—as the most important drafting and interpretive tool apart from text.”  Id. at 37 (citing 
Gluck & Bressman, supra note 57, at 965). 
The work of Professor Victoria Nourse broadens and deepens Judge Katzmann’s observations, 
offering “five rule-based decision theory Principles, akin to canons, for judges and lawyers to make 
readings of legislative history more objective.”  Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory 
Interpretation: Legislative History by the Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70, 76–77, 90–134 (Nourse’s rules are 
the following: (1) know Congress’s rules; (2) focus on the most recent legislative decision first; (3) 
proximity to text and specificity to the interpretive issue are central to the most reliable history; (4) 
never cite losers’ history as an authoritative source of textual meaning; and (5) congress does not play 
by judicial rules). 
96. The principal objection to Judge Katzmann’s book and to work advocating use of legislative 
history generally is that Congress does not vote on committee reports, even when it plainly could.  See 
Manning, supra note 93, at 561–62. 
97. HANKS, HERZ, & NEMERSON, supra note 74, at 253–54. 
98. KATZMANN, supra note 1, at 29–31.  
 
CEDRONE_FINAL_03DEC19 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/3/2019  7:50 PM 
58 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [103:43 
 
 
substitute its judgment or to alter the terms of the statute.”99  However, he also 
embraces use of purpose so that “Congress will perceive the courts as 
productive partners . . .”100 
Purposive interpreters are fundamentally optimistic about their own ability 
to figure out what Congress was trying to accomplish.101  This optimism grows 
out of the Legal Process school of Hart and Sacks, whose defining advice is 
that courts should assume in difficult cases that “the legislature was made up of 
reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably,”102  Hart and 
Sacks have been accused of inconsistency because they appear to recognize the 
important of text yet also hold that text should sometimes yield to purpose.103  
Their view has also been critiqued as being based on undue optimism about the 
courts’ ability to discern Congress’ purposes.104  However, their central 
contribution is that legislature and court partner to effect the Congressional 
purpose, and this view supports judges in a robust inquiry into the purpose of 
legislation.105 
 
99. Id. at 29. 
100. Id. at 10; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. 
L. REV. 405, 434–35 (1989) (“Legal process approaches stand poised somewhere between agency 
theories of the judicial role and understandings of an altogether different sort.”). 
101. KATZMANN, supra note 1, at 33–34.  
102. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN 
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1378 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip C. Frickey eds., 
1994).   
103. John F. Manning, Justice Ginsburg and the New Legal Process, 127 HARV. L. REV. 455, 
455–56 (2013) (“[T]he Legal Process materials developed by Harvard Professors Henry Hart and 
Albert Sacks presented two conflicting techniques for effectuating statutory purpose.”).  The first 
technique is the familiar textual constraint: “[J]udges must not ‘give the words . . .  a meaning they will 
not bear.’”  Id. at 455.  The second is the apparent assumption that text can at times yield to purpose.  
Id. at 455–56. 
104. Sunstein, supra note 100, at 435. 
105. Subsequent theorists have carried the partnership idea much further.  Addressing the 
difficult problem of how to apply older statutes in newer circumstances, Professor William Eskridge 
posits that statutory interpretation is and should be “dynamic”; that is, “as the distance between 
enactment and interpretation increases, a pure originalist inquiry becomes impossible and/or 
irrelevant.”  WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 5–6 (1994).  
Eskridge argues that this thesis is both descriptive (i.e. it says what courts do) and normative (i.e. it 
describes what courts should do).  Id. at 6.  This theory explores how deeply purposive readings of 
statutory text support legislative intent. 
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C. Setting the Stage for King v. Burwell 
The courts for a long time have dwelt in a place of interpretive pluralism. 
Less charitably, once could accuse the courts of inconsistency, or even disarray, 
much as Hart and Sacks did fifty years ago, declaring the “hard truth of the 
matter” to be “that American courts have no intelligible, generally accepted, 
and consistently applied theory of statutory interpretation.”106  These concerns 
continue to occupy scholars today, with calls for consistent interpretive rules to 
be followed by courts107 or even imposed by Congress.108 
Looking to the practical world of the courts, some have argued that a merger 
of sorts between purposivism and textualism seems to have taken place.109  
Professor John Molot of Georgetown considers the differences between 
textualist and purposivist scholars to be “narrow.”110  Professor John Manning 
of Harvard, in evaluating members of the Supreme Court in 2011 says that most 
are “textually constrained purposivists” or “purpose-sensitive textualists,” and 
 
106. HART & SACKS, supra note 102, at 1169. 
107. See Gluck, supra note 18, at 1767–68, 1848–55 (defending methodological consistency in 
statutory interpretation).  
108. See generally Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 2085 (2002) (arguing that Congress should exercise its constitutional power to dictate 
the tools for courts’ interpretation of federal statutes).  Of course, not everyone views this situation as 
particularly problematic.  Professor Eskridge, like the courts he studies, pushes away from “grand 
theory” which privileges one or another “foundational” theory, positing a theory of “practical 
reasoning” which has both descriptive and normative power for understanding the process of 
interpretation as it is actually undertaken by courts.  Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 45, at 321–23.  
More recent academic writing has suggested a hierarchy among the foundational interpretive foci and 
the evidence that supports them.  See Gluck, supra note 18, at 1758 (arguing for “modified textualism” 
which looks to text, legislative history, and interpretive canons in that order). 
109. Molot, supra note 5, at 35–36 (“[T]hat which unites textualists and purposivists seems to 
outweigh that which divides them.”); see also Manning, supra note 4, at 146–47. 
110. Molot, supra note 5, at 4.  Molot identifies three potential differences; he claims that one is 
real but exaggerated in importance and the other two illusory.  Id. at 36–43.  The real-but-exaggerated 
difference concerns textualists’ rejection and purposivists’ embrace of legislative history.  Id. at 38–
39; see infra notes 67–68, 92–96, and accompanying text.  The illusory distinctions concern how likely 
an interpreter is to find an ambiguity that invites consideration of purpose; this distinction is illusory, 
claims Molot, because the tendency to see language as clear of ambiguity is not correlated to 
interpretive philosophy.  Id. at 39–42.  Finally, a third potential difference concerns when it is 
appropriate to look to context: “Textualists accuse purposivists of continuing to look to context after 
they have arrived at a clear textual meaning.”  Id. at 36–37 (emphasis in original).  However, this too 
is illusory: “[T]o the extent that both schools use the same interpretive tools to reach the same 
interpretive result, it really does not matter if one purports to use context to decide on a textual meaning 
while the other admits that it is adjusting the text’s meaning to reconcile it with context.”  Id. at 37–
38. 
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suggests that these two positions “may be the same thing.”111  Most centrally, 
if both a textualist and purposivist inquiry are limited by the reasonable sematic 
meaning of the text, again in the words of Molot, “[W]e are all textualists in an 
important sense.”112  
Yet, Molot is correct that a “narrow” distinction remains.  After starting 
with text and context, textualists will diverge into canons of construction and 
purposivists will likely consult legislative history.113  The textualist will not 
depart from semantic meaning (informed by context and sometimes purpose) 
even in the face of very strong evidence of contrary legislative intent.114  A 
purposivist will recognize the importance of text but read that text in light of its 
apparent purposes and will sometimes reach results that are in tension with the 
language of the statute.115 
In light of the current state of affairs, King v. Burwell has much to offer.  In 
many ways, the case reflects the state of the judiciary today: the Court uses 
many tools to find meaning: text, context and scheme, and purpose.116  In 
reaching its result, the Court avoids legislative history.117  The result itself is 
unusual: the Court makes sense of the statutory scheme, to the point of avoiding 
the implications of plain text.118  While purposive in its basic orientation, the 
case reflects the relatively narrow distance between textualists and 
purposivists.119   
 
111. Manning, supra note 4, at 146–47 (identifying Justices Breyer and Stevens as embracing 
Holy Trinity-style purposivism and Justices Scalia and Thomas as embracing New Textualism); see 
also id. at 113 (observing in 2010 that the Supreme Court “has not cited Holy Trinity positively for 
more than two decades”). 
112. Molot, supra note 5, at 43. 
113. Sunstein, supra note 100, at 429.  In view of the powerful critique of textualists, reliance 
on legislative history has declined in recent decades.  See generally David S. Law & David Zaring, 
Law Versus Ideology: The Supreme Court and the Use of Legislative History, 51 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1653, 1671–72 n.73–79 (2010) (empirical study; includes some information about lower federal 
courts at notes 73–79 and accompanying text). 
114. The textualist will only depart from a textual interpretation in the very rare case of drafting 
error or more limited conceptions of absurdity.  See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 234–39 
(discussing drafting error and the absurdity doctrine and noting limitations on the absurdity doctrine). 
115. See, e.g., Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892).  
116. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489–96 (2015).  
117. See id.  
118. Id. at 2490. 
119. See id. at 2495. 
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III. KING V. BURWELL AND THE USE OF TEXT AND PURPOSE 
A close reading of the opinion and the dissent in King v. Burwell bears out 
the observation that all interpreters on the Supreme Court now give great weight 
to text.120  Nonetheless, the seemingly plain meaning of the statutory phrase 
“established by the State” does not control the outcome of the case.121  In King, 
the Court either interprets this phrase expansively or indeed pushes past its 
reasonable semantic meaning.122  If the holding pushes past the reasonable 
semantic meaning of the text, then the case finds an important limit on the 
identified merger between textualism and purposivism because statutory 
purpose appears to trump the plain meaning of the text.123  Even if the case 
merely reads “established by the State” expansively, it is still important for its 
use of purpose and scheme to read a statutory provision in the broadest possible 
terms.  
The King majority follows a unique interpretive path in the case.  The Court 
views the case as exceptional; the majority explicitly finds it so when deciding 
the Chevron issue.124  The majority then proceeds to engage deeply with the 
Congressional purposes for enacting the statute; indeed, the Court even begins, 
in a cursory and not entirely accurate way, to engage with the legislative process 
of the Affordable Care Act.125  Finally, and perhaps most controversially, the 
case engages in prudential reasoning, looking to likely real-world implications 
of various constructions of the statute.126  
This Section begins with a brief description of the legal issues in King, 
follows with some analysis of the textual arguments, and concludes with a 
description of the purposive arguments that lead the majority to hold as it does.  
 
120. Id. at 2488–92, 2502–03 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
121. 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(2)(A) (2012); King, 135 S. Ct. at 2495. 
122. 135 S. Ct. at 2490.  The Court suggests that an expansive reading is appropriate when it 
observes that “the Act may not always use the phrase ‘established by the State’ in its most natural 
sense.”  Id.  The dissent is considerably more direct: if the Court’s reading of “established by the State” 
is correct, “words no longer have meaning.”  Id. at 2497. 
123. Molot, supra note 5, at 35–43; supra notes 109–12 and accompanying text. 
124. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488–89. 
125. Id. at 2490–92.  
126. Id. at 2492–94. 
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A. The Statutory Challenge to the Affordable Care Act 
There is little doubt that the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act127 
was passed and has been implemented in an atmosphere of partisan political 
division and rancor.128  After an epic legal battle over the constitutionality of 
statute’s mandate that individuals purchase health insurance and the statute’s 
conditional expansion of Medicaid funding,129 the Supreme Court two terms 
later took up an enormously consequential question of statutory 
interpretation.130  
The terms of the statute appear plain: states are permitted but not required 
to establish Exchanges, which are markets designed to sell health insurance to 
individuals.131  Should a state refuse to establish an Exchange, the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services is directed to step in to “establish and operate such 
Exchange” within that state.132  These two forms of Exchanges have 
colloquially become known as the State Exchanges and the Federal 
Exchange.133  
For individuals with incomes between 100 and 400 percent of the federal 
poverty level, subsidies are available in the form of federal income tax credits; 
these subsidies offset the cost of health insurance purchased on an Exchange.134  
And now, the troublesome provision: the tax credit is available to taxpayers 
whose insurance plan was purchased on “an Exchange established by the 
State.”135  Thus, the Court must decide whether tax credits are available to 
taxpayers who live in states on the Federal Exchange, or whether they are only 
available to taxpayers in states that have chosen to establish State Exchanges?   
The consequences of eliminating subsidies on the Federal Exchange would 
have been enormous.  Without the tax credit subsidy, individuals would have 
been required to bear the full cost of premiums for insurance plans purchased 
 
127. 42 U.S.C. §§ 18001−121 (2010). 
128. Tessa Berenson, Reminder: The House Voted to Repeal Obamacare More Than 50 Times, 
TIME (Mar. 24, 2017), https://time.com/4712725/ahca-house-repeal-votes-obamacare/ 
[https://perma.cc/L7VA-62TR]. 
129. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
130. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2480. 
131. 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(1) (2010). 
132. 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c)(1) (2010). 
133. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2487. 
134. 26 U.S.C. § 36B(a), (b)(3)(A)(i) (2012). 
135. Id. § 36B(b)(2) (emphasis added). 
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through the Federal Exchange.136  Should an individual’s cost for premiums on 
the least expensive plan exceed 8 percent of household income, that individual 
would be no longer mandated to purchase insurance.137  As the Court explained, 
without a mandate to purchase insurance, healthier people would be less likely 
to do so, resulting in increasing premiums.138  These premium increases would 
eventually render insurance unaffordable for all and drive insurers out of the 
marketplace.139  The Court referred to this phenomenon as an “economic ‘death 
spiral’” and pointed to the experience of many states in the 1990s as evidence 
of these dire consequences.140 
As is well known by this point, the Court found that subsidies are available 
on both the State Exchanges and the Federal Exchange.141  To reach this result, 
the Court took three legal steps.142  First, it determined that it would not defer 
to IRS regulations, even though those regulations reached the same result as the 
Court.143  Declaring this an “extraordinary case[]” of “deep ‘economic and 
political significance,’” the Court declared, “This is not a case for the IRS.”144  
Second, it determined that the critical language “an Exchange established by 
 
136. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2493. 
137. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e)(1)(A) (2012). 
138. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2484.  
139. Id. 
140. Id. at 2482.   
141. Id. at 2496. 
142. Id. at 2488–96. 
143. Id. at 2488–89. 
144. Id.  The circuit split that brought the case to the Supreme Court involved a difference over 
the deference due the IRS interpretation.  The Fourth Circuit viewed the statutory language as 
“ambiguous and subject to at least two different interpretations” and deferred to the IRS interpretation.  
King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 372, 376 (4th Cir. 2014) (deferring to the IRS under Chevron U.S.A. 
Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).  On the same day the Fourth Circuit opinion 
issued, the D.C. Circuit vacated the IRS rule, holding that the language of the statute unambiguously 
forbids tax credit subsidies on the Federal Exchange.  Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 394 (D.C. Cir. 
2014) (finding that Chevron deference did not apply because the language unambiguously forbid the 
agency’s reading).  
 Notably, Justice Scalia, writing for himself, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito in dissent, did not 
cite Chevron, although his view of the statute accords with the Chevron framework.  Justice Scalia 
finds no ambiguity in the statute: the meaning of “established by the State” is to him “obvious—so 
obvious there would hardly be a need for the Supreme Court to hear a case about it.”  King, 135 S. Ct. 
at 2496 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  The clear import of this reasoning is that there would be no need for 
agency deference: at so-called Chevron step one, the court decides whether a statute is ambiguous or 
not and enforces the plain meaning of the language if it is not ambiguous.  Id. at 2488 (citing Chevron, 
467 U.S. at 842–43). 
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the State under [42 U.S.C. § 18031]” is ambiguous.145  Finally, considering the 
“context and structure” of the Act, the Court concluded that the provision in 
question “allows tax credits for insurance purchased on any Exchange created 
under the Act.”146 
B. The Court’s Reasoning: Text and Purpose 
Most of the Court’s opinion in King v. Burwell turns on two modes of 
analysis: a deep look at the text, context, and structure of the statute and what 
one might call prudential or pragmatic analysis of the consequences of various 
interpretations of the statute.147  The text-context-structure analysis is a very 
familiar form of analysis rooted in text, although executed in this case in a way 
that seems to subordinate text to purpose and scheme.148  The prudential or 
pragmatic analysis has its eye on the consequences of particular 
interpretations.149    
1. Text-Context-Structure 
a. Using Structure to Set the Stage 
The stage is set for the Court’s textualist analysis through a five-page 
discussion of the ACA’s scheme and Congress’ purposes in enacting the 
ACA.150  This structural understanding of the statute is clear from the first 
sentence, which recognizes the ACA’s “series of interlocking reforms designed 
to expand coverage in the individual health insurance market.”151  The Court 
proceeds to describe these three interlocking reforms.  The first reform consists 
of two parts: a “guaranteed issue” requirement which “bar[s] insurers from 
denying coverage to any person because of his [or her] health” and a 
“community rating” requirement which “bar[s] insurers from charging a person 
higher premiums for the same reason.”152  The second reform consists of an 
 
145. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2491. 
146. Id. at 2495–96. 
147. Id. at 2488–96. 
148. See id. at 2489. 
149. In the words of Professor William Eskridge, “A pragmatic interpretation is one that most 
intelligently and creatively ‘fits’ into the complex web of social and legal practices.”  ESKRIDGE, supra 
note 105, at 201. 
150. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2485–89. 
151. Id. at 2485. 
152. Id. 
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individual mandate, which “require[s] individuals to buy insurance or pay a 
penalty.”153  Finally, the third reform provides “tax credits to certain individuals 
to ensure that they could afford the insurance they were required to buy.”154 
Unusually, the Court cites the Congressional findings that are part of the 
ACA for the proposition that “the guaranteed issue and community rating 
requirements would not work without the coverage requirement.”155  In the 
statute, Congress finds that the individual mandate “together with the other 
provisions of this Act” is necessary to broaden participation in the health 
insurance pools and thereby guarantee a functioning health insurance market.156  
The Court spells out one of the more crucial “other provisions,” by declaring 
without further citation that the individual mandate “would not work 
without . . . tax credits,” and finds further evidence for its view that the three 
reforms are inextricably intertwined in the fact that the statute provides that the 
three reforms should take effect on the same day.157 
In a section of the opinion that has had important influences on 
administrative law,158 the Court also casts aside the notion that it owes Chevron 
deference to the Internal Revenue Service, which interpreted the statute to 
provide tax credits to individuals who obtained insurance on the Federal 
Exchange.159  In a scant two paragraphs, the Court concludes “[t]his is not a 
case for the IRS,” finding that the case is “extraordinary” and the matter should 
therefore be decided by the Court because the question is one of “deep 
 
153. Id. at 2486. 
154. Id.  The credits at issue are refundable tax credits, and they are available to individuals with 
household incomes between 100 and 400 percent of the federal poverty line.  Id. at 2487. 
155. Id. at 2487 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(I) (2010)). 
156. 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(I) (2010). 
157. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2487. 
158. See David Gamage, Forward—King v. Burwell Symposium: Comments on the 
Commentaries (And on Some Elephants in the Room), 43 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 1–3 (2015) and the 
accompanying articles in the Symposium Issue, particularly Leandra Lederman & Joseph C. Dugan, 
King v. Burwell: What Does It Portend for Chevron’s Domain?, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 72 (2015). 
159. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489.  The IRS interpretation of the statute can be found at 77 Fed. Reg. 
30377, 30378 (May 23, 2012).  See also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 842–43 (1984).  Chevron requires agencies to follow clear statutory commands but permits 
agencies to adopt reasonable constructions of ambiguous statutory language.  Id.  Thus, in evaluating 
agency action challenged under Chevron, a court first asks whether the statutory language is clear.  Id. 
at 842.  If it is, the court must ensure that the agency follow the statute.  Id. at 842–43.  If the language 
is ambiguous, Chevron requires that the court defer to the agency so long as it has construed the statute 
in a permissible way.  Id. at 843. 
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economic and political significance that is central to [the] statutory scheme.”160  
The exception contemplates that Congress would not have left so important a 
matter to agency discretion without a clearer indication of its intent to do so.161   
In addition to the Court’s philosophic decision not to leave this question to 
agency discretion, there is an important pragmatic dimension to the Court’s 
Chevron holding.162  If the Court’s opinion treated the case as involving a 
question whether to defer to the agency, it could have affirmed the regulation 
and saved the subsidies, affirming the reasoning employed by the Fourth 
Circuit.163  However, in the future, the IRS controlled by a Presidential 
administration hostile to the statute (such as the Trump administration) could 
then exercise its regulatory authority to reverse course.164  Because the Court 
construed the statute de novo, its holding is not subject to future reversal by 
agency regulation.165  At a basic level, the Court’s decision can be read to 
support the principle of legislative supremacy by limiting the executive’s ability 
to undercut the effectiveness of the statute through interpretation.  However, in 
doing so, the Court also increases the judicial role by interpreting the statute 
with no deference to agency opinions. 
Administrative law issues aside, the first five pages of the opinion look 
primarily to the structure of the Act to understand that plan.166  Thus, this 
section of the opinion examines what the statute attempts to accomplish, its 
interlocking reforms intended to do so, and even the history of efforts to address 
the problem.167  These considerations—in absence of any Chevron deference 
 
160. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488–89. 
161. Id. at 2489. 
162. For further commentary, see Gluck, supra note 75, at 64–66 (arguing that the Court’s 
decision signals that the majority claims a larger role in statutory interpretation cases and that the “real 
divide” across the opinions is “how a Court that unanimously agrees on the priority of text-focused 
interpretation sees its own role in relation to Congress’ written plans”). 
163. King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 372−76 (4th Cir. 2014). 
164. Prof. Gamage believes that the Court found “deep economic and political significance” at 
least partly because of the presence of two deeply divided “epistemic communities” with “different 
worldviews and social networks.”  Gamage, supra note 158, at 3–5.  As Gamage notes, the Court would 
have been quite aware that if the Treasury Department were to be “controlled by the other epistemic 
community with its different worldview,” a revision of the IRS regulation could be made in short order; 
the Court effectively foreclosed this kind of political manipulation of the statute’s meaning based on 
partisan politics.  Id. at 5.  
165. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488–89. 
166. Id. at 2485–89. 
167. Id. 
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and the associated insulation of the Court’s interpretation from future 
regulatory reversal—provide important context for Court’s textual analysis.168  
b. Establishing Textual Ambiguity and Interpreting the Statute 
Most of the Court’s textualist arguments occur in the portion of the opinion 
that decides that the phrase “an Exchange established by the State under [42 
U.S.C. § 18031]” is ambiguous.169  This part of the opinion is prefaced by a 
textualist veneer declaration that “plain” statutory language must be 
“enforce[d] . . . according to its terms,” quickly followed by caveats that “the 
meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become evident 
when placed in context.”170   
The Court itself recognizes the difficulty in its mission.  Before turning to 
context, it candidly makes two admissions: that it might “seem” that a Federal 
Exchange cannot be “established by the State,” and that it also might “seem” 
that a Federal exchange cannot be “established under 42 U.S.C. § 18031.”171  
While the Court does conclude that the provision in question  “is properly 
viewed as ambiguous,” it concludes that section of the opinion with an odd 
circumlocution, saying only that, after reading the provision in context, “we 
cannot conclude that the phrase . . . is unambiguous.”172  This underwhelming 
conclusion, embedded within a double-negative, nods at the uphill difficulty of 
the Court’s textualist arguments. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Court’s principal arguments establishing 
ambiguity do not turn on plain meaning.173  Instead, the Court makes 
intertextual arguments, referring to how various provisions of the ACA are 
 
168. Id. at 2488. 
169. Id. at 2489–92. 
170. Id. at 2489 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 
(2000)). 
171. Id. at 2490. 
172. Id. at 2491–92.  In his dissent, Justice Scalia has a field day with this part of the opinion.  
He considers the question to be “obvious—so obvious there would hardly be a need for the Supreme 
Court to hear a case about it.”  Id. at 2496 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Even more bluntly, Justice Scalia 
asks, “Could anyone maintain with a straight face that § 36B is unclear?”  Id. at 2502 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting).  Justice Brett Kavanaugh commented (before he joined the Supreme Court) that the 
ambiguity analysis is already “indeterminate,” and noted that holding “established by the State” to be 
ambiguous may have “broader repercussions,” leading “some judges [to] find fewer statutes ‘clear’ 
because the statutory language in question is no less ambiguous than the phrase ‘established by the 
State’ . . . .”  Kavanaugh, supra note 3, at 2159. 
173. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489–92. 
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designed to interact.174  For example, the Court places weight on the language 
in 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c)(1) that provides that the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services “shall . . . establish and operate such Exchange within the 
State” if a State elects not to establish its own Exchange.175  The Court 
concludes that the word “such” indicates that “State Exchanges and Federal 
Exchanges are equivalent—they must meet the same requirements, perform the 
same functions, and serve the same purposes.”176  Here the Court uses the word 
“such” as a linguistic hook, even providing the Black’s Law Dictionary 
definition of the word, to connect the Federal Exchange to the purposes of 
Exchanges in the first place, ultimately concluding that Federal and State 
Exchanges “do not . . . differ in any meaningful way.”177 
The Court turns next to the statutory requirement, contained in § 18031 that 
Exchanges “shall make available qualified health plans to qualified 
individuals.”178  Section 18032 defines a “qualified individual” in part as one 
who “resides in the State that established the Exchange.”179  The Court rests on 
the fact that there could be no qualified individuals on the Federal Exchange if 
this language were taken at face value, and the Federal Exchange would be 
unable to function as an Exchange at all.180 
Finally, the Court reads the provision authorizing the Federal 
Exchange, § 18041, which contains the “such Exchange” language, as directing 
the Secretary of HHS to establish and operate a § 18031 exchange in states that 
elect not to set up their own Exchanges.181  In further support of this point, the 
Court notes that “[a]ll of the requirements that an Exchange must meet are in 
Section 18031, so it is sensible to regard all Exchanges as established under that 
provision [i.e. § 18031],” and then points to a number of specific requirements 
that are dependent on § 18031.182  The ultimate conclusion the Court reaches 
on text is based on these contextual/intertextual arguments.183  Interestingly, 
 
174. Id. at 2490. 
175. Id. at 2489 (emphasis in original). 
176. Id. 
177. Id. at 2489–90. 
178. Id. at 2490 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(2)(A)). 
179. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 18032(f)(1)(A)). 
180. Id. 
181. Id. at 2490–91. 
182. Id. at 2491. 
183. See id. at 2492 (first citing Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 536 (2004); and then citing 
Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 385 (2013)).  
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one of the few canons cited in the Court’s opinions does not control the day.184  
Responding to the dissent and the petitioners’ argument that the phrase 
“established by the State” are surplusage on the Court’s reading of the statute,185 
the Court declares that the canon against surplusage is “not absolute.”186 
2. Purposive, Pragmatic, and Prudential Reasoning 
The first five pages of the Court’s opinion portend something beyond an 
examination of the statutory scheme.187  The Court recounts a detailed history 
of attempts to reform the United States health insurance market.188  This history 
provides a deep and granular look at the backdrop against which Congress 
legislated, suggesting a far deeper dive into Congresses’ purposes than the 
single Senate committee hearing cited in this portion of the opinion might 
suggest.189 
First, the Court’s definition of the subject matter of the legislation is precise 
and accurate: the reforms at issue in the case are not of the entire healthcare or 
even the entire health insurance system: instead, they are directed at the most 
problematic part—the individual insurance market.190  Second, section I.A of 
the opinion details what it terms the “long history of failed health insurance 
reform,” citing the experience of failures in Washington and New York—which 
enacted guaranteed issue and community rating requirements but no individual 
 
184. Id. 
185. Id.  The dissent charges that the Court gives the phrase “established by the State” as having 
no meaning at all.  Id. at 2498 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
186. Id.  While the dissent agrees that “the rule against treating a [statutory] term as a redundancy 
is far from categorical,” it cites no less than Marbury v. Madison in support of the proposition that “the 
rule against treating [a statutory term] as a nullity is as close to absolute as interpretive principles get.”  
Id. at 2498 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)). 
187. Id. at 2485–89. 
188. Id. at 2485–86. 
189. Id. at 2486 (citing Examining Individual State Experiences with Health Care Reform 
Coverage Initiatives in the Context of National Reform: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., 
Labor, and Pensions, 111th Cong. 9 (2009)).  The Court cites this hearing for the fact that the 
combination of the three interlocking reforms reduced the uninsured rate in Massachusetts to 2.6 
percent.  Id.  This is a seemingly minor use of legislative history to support a background detail, but it 
is worth noting that the point about interlocking reforms in Massachusetts is central to the Court’s 
understanding of the ACA.  (Interestingly, the Court cites page 9 of the transcript, but the document 
makes reference to the uninsured rate in Massachusetts on page 8.) 
190. This is clear from the first sentence of the opinion.  See id. at 2492. 
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mandates or subsidies—and the more successful program in Massachusetts—
which enacted the same three basic reforms as the ACA.191  
Given that this is the starting point for the Court’s analysis, the ending 
should come as no surprise.  The final paragraphs of the opinion begin, perhaps 
somewhat defensively, by reminding the reader that “[i]n a democracy, the 
power to make the law rests with those chosen by the people,” and noting that 
the judicial role is “more confined.”192  While claiming to “respect the role of 
the Legislature,” the Court intones that “[a] fair reading of legislation demands 
a fair understanding of the legislative plan.”193 
However, as the very next sentence reveals, the words “legislative plan” 
should not be read only to mean that the Court considers the structure of the act 
when interpreting its provisions.194  Indeed, the next paragraph, worth quoting 
in full, says: 
Congress passed the Affordable Care Act to improve health 
insurance markets, not to destroy them.  If at all possible, we 
must interpret the Act in a way that is consistent with the 
former, and avoids the latter.  Section 36B can fairly be read 
consistent with what we see as Congress’s plan, and that is the 
reading we adopt.195  
The Court here candidly admits that its decision is rooted in the purpose of 
the statute: “[T]o improve health insurance markets, not destroy them” and that 
its interpretation “if at all possible” must be consistent with this purpose.196  
And yet, an important issue remains.  Does the holding of King v. Burwell 
discard the text of the statute in reaching its admittedly purposivist result?  
Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion argues that the holding does no such thing, 
finding ambiguity in the text and adopting a reading that the Court labors to 
present as plausible.197  The dissent views the Court’s reading as ridiculous and 
 
191. Id. at 2485–86. 
192. Id. at 2496. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. 
196. Id. 
197. See id. at 2489, 2491. 
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plainly contrary to the statutory text.198  To the dissenters, the Court has 
wholesale discarded text in favor of purpose, à la Church of the Holy Trinity.199  
The dissent criticizes two aspects of the majority’s reliance on purpose.200  
First, the dissent says that the purpose identified by the Court does not come 
from the text of the statute, which clearly makes tax credits unavailable on the 
federal exchanges.201  Second, the dissent points out that involving states in the 
administration of the statutory health insurance regime is also an important part 
of the purpose of the Affordable Care Act.202  If premium support is not 
available on the federal exchange, states have a greater incentive to set up their 
own state exchanges203—an incentive which is no longer present once the Court 
decides to make premium support available on the federal exchange.204 
The consequences of these disputes are important.  Whether one supports 
the outcome or not, if one views this case as allowing purpose to trump text, 
then the Court has indeed returned to old-style Church of the Holy Trinity 
purposivism.  If one instead views the case as one where the Court derived 
purpose from a close reading of text and then used that purpose to animate a 
textually plausible reading of an ambiguous provision, then this case falls into 
some mild form of textually constrained purposivism, to return to John 
Manning’s terms.205  Indeed, the opinion labors to put the case into the latter 
 
198. Id. at 2502 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Statutory design and purpose matter only to the extent 
they help clarify an otherwise ambiguous provision.  Could anyone maintain with a straight face 
that § 36B is unclear?”). 
199. Id.  Needless to say, the dissent finds this approach thoroughly illegitimate.  Justice 
Kavanaugh notes that the court seems to employ a type of “mistake canon” that does not allow recourse 
to legislative history but that does permits courts to “adopt what they conclude Congress meant rather 
than what Congress said.”  Kavanaugh, supra note 3, at 2159 (reviewing KATZMANN, supra note 1).  
Kavanaugh considers this type of mistake correction a “narrower form of Holy Trinity.”  Id.  In 
response, Judge Katzmann argued that in King, the Court “showed that it was willing to depart from 
what would otherwise be the most natural reading of a phrase when context and the structure of a 
statute require it.”  Robert Katzmann, Response to Judge Kavanaugh’s Review of Judging Statutes, 129 
HARV. L. REV. F. 388, 394 (2016).  Katzmann seeks to avoid the Holy Trinity comparison entirely, 
declaring that “the interpretive exercise can be complicated, and is not usefully reduced to 
characterizations of the Holy Trinity rubric as simplistically substituting a law’s spirit for clear text.”  
Id. 
200. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2502 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
201. Id. at 2502–05 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
202. Id. at 2504 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
203. Id. 
204. See id. 
205. See discussion supra Section I.B. 
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category, or even into the category of purpose-sensitive textualism.206  
However, these efforts are not compelling. 
Instead, it is plain from reading the opinion that the Court ventured far 
beyond statutory text in reaching its conclusions.207  Prudential reasoning—that 
is, evaluating a decision in view of its likely consequences—is usually only 
explicitly invoked in the context of constitutional interpretation.208  Indeed, 
prudential reasoning in statutory interpretation cases risks collapsing judicial 
interpretation into the legislative function: deciding the best outcome on policy 
grounds, and setting a legal rule that encompasses that outcome, a result 
generally thought undemocratic and undesirable when undertaken by a court.209  
Yet, King v. Burwell seems a prime case for prudential reasoning.  Two 
major studies, one from the Urban Institute and the other from the Rand 
Corporation had each concluded that eliminating subsidies on the federal 
exchanges would result in approximately eight million citizens becoming 
uninsured and premiums increasing by more than 35% in the nongroup 
market.210  This research was before the Supreme Court, most clearly described 
 
206. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2492. 
207. See id. at 2493–96. 
208. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (noting that decisions to 
overrule prior holdings are “customarily informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic 
considerations . . .”); Neil S. Siegel, Prudentialism in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 6 DUKE J. CONST. 
L. & PUB. POL’Y 16, 21–25 (2011) (identifying forms of prudential reasoning by Justices Stevens, 
Alito, and Scalia); see also PHILIP BOBBIT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 
61 (1982); PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 16–17 (1991). 
209. This collapse would destroy any notion that the legislature is or ought to be supreme and 
that the judge ought to be a “faithful agent” of the legislature, a widely held assumption across the 
ideological spectrum.  KATZMANN, supra note 1, at 29 (“I start with the premise that the role of the 
courts is to interpret the law in a way that is faithful to its meaning.  The role of the court is not to 
substitute its judgment or to alter the terms of the statute.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and 
Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 63 (1994) (“We [judges] are 
supposed to be faithful agents, not independent principals.”).  But see Richard A. Posner, Comment on 
Professor Gluck’s “Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts”, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 11, 11–13 (2015) 
(referring to “judicial deference to Congress” as a “pretense,” asserting that “most of the time statutory 
interpretation is better described as creation or completion than as interpretation and that politics and 
consequences are the major drivers of the outcome,” and stating bluntly that “judges prefer for reasons 
of self-protection to be thought of as agents rather than as principals”). 
210. LINDA J. BLUMBERG, MATTHEW BUETTGENS, & JOHN HOLAHAN, THE IMPLICATIONS OF 
A SUPREME COURT FINDING FOR THE PLAINTIFF IN KING V. BURWELL: 8.2 MILLION MORE 
UNINSURED AND 35% HIGHER PREMIUMS 1 (2015), 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/49246/2000062-The-Implications-King-vs-
Burwell.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PJM-CN7K] (finding that 8.2 million people would become uninsured 
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in amicus briefs.211  The merits briefs acknowledged the consequences of 
eliminating subsidies on the federal exchange as well, although it argued that 
these disastrous consequences showed that the phrase “established by the State” 
should not be read to defeat the purposes of the entire statute.212 
Moreover, just five days before oral argument, Secretary of Health and 
Human Services Sylvia Matthews Burwell sent a letter to key Congressional 
leaders that spelled out that “a decision against the Administration in the King 
case would cause massive damage” in the form of millions of people losing 
insurance, rising premiums for those who remain insured in the individual 
insurance market, and greater reliance on emergency room care by uninsured 
individuals, driving up health insurance costs “for everyone.”213  Further, 
repeating the phrase “massive damage” for the second time in two paragraphs, 
Secretary Burwell stated that she knew of “no administrative actions that 
could . . . undo the massive damage to our health care system that would be 
 
in federal exchange states under the study’s assumptions and that average premiums in the nongroup 
insurance market would increase by an estimated 35 percent); Evan Saltzman & Christine Eibner, The 
Effect of Eliminating the Affordable Care Act’s Tax Credits in Federally Facilitated Marketplaces, 
RAND CORP. (2015), https://www.rand.org/pubs/periodicals/health-quarterly/issues/v5/n1/07.html 
[https://perma.cc/X9CA-ZNLD]; EVAN SALTZMAN & CHRISTINE EIBNER, THE EFFECT OF 
ELIMINATING THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT’S TAX CREDITS IN FEDERALLY FACILITATED 
MARKETPLACES 2 (2015) 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR900/RR980/RAND_RR980.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N47F-4CQU] (finding that 8.0 million people become uninsured in federal exchange 
states under the study’s assumptions and that unsubsidized premiums in the ACA-compliant individual 
market would increase 47%). 
211. See Brief for Bipartisan Economic Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 
16–24, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No. 14-114) for a robust summary of the Urban 
Institute and Rand studies mentioned below in note 210.  Many other amicus briefs used this data as 
the basis for examining the consequences within subsections of the US population.  See, e.g., Brief of 
Catholic Health Association of the United States and Catholic Charities USA as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14-114); Brief of American Cancer Society et al. 
as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14-114).  Amici supporting the 
petitioner largely did not dispute the disruptive effects of eliminating subsidies on the federal exchange; 
in their view, if the language of the statute created a problem, it was a problem for Congress and not 
the Court to fix.  See, e.g., Brief of Jonathan H. Adler and Michael F. Cannon as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners at 36–37, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14-114). 
212. Brief for the Respondents at 36–37, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14-114) (citing Urban 
Institute and Rand Corporation studies as evidence of declines in enrollment and premium increases). 
213. Letter from Sylvia Matthews Burwell to Senator Orrin G. Hatch (Feb. 24, 2015).  A similar 
letter was sent to the House, although I have only been able to locate online versions with the addressee 
redacted. 
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caused by an adverse decision.”214  The New York Times viewed the letter as 
“put[ting] pressure on the [Supreme Court] to rule in favor of the 
administration,” viewing the letter’s “implicit message” as telling the Court 
“that the White House has no contingency plans” and that “if the court strikes 
down subsidies, the justices will be responsible for causing hardship to lower-
income people and chaos in insurance markets around the country.”215 
At oral arguments five days later, several Justices considered the 
consequences of a ruling for the petitioners.  At different points in the argument, 
the basic factual picture painted by the Urban Institute and Rand Corp. research 
was acknowledged by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, 
Sotomayor, and Kagan.216  A look at context of the Justices’ comments about 
the consequences of the case reveals both that members of the Court were aware 
of the consequences and that they struggled to find an appropriate way to take 
account of the consequences within accepted principles of statutory 
interpretation and related legal doctrine.217 
For instance, Justices Sotomayor and Kennedy, in colloquy with counsel 
for the petitioners, questioned whether states that chose to have the federal 
government establish their exchanges and whose citizens were denied subsidies 
on that federal exchange would be unconstitutionally coerced into setting up 
their own exchange.218  Justice Kennedy suggested that the Court should 
 
214. Id.  It is notable that both uses of the phrase “massive damage” occur in the first sentence 
of their respective paragraphs. 
215. Robert Pear, Congress Is Told Administration Has No Remedy for a Ruling Against Health 
Law, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2015, at A15. 
216. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 54–55, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14-114) (Scalia, J.) 
(“If the consequences are as disastrous as you say, so many million people without—without insurance 
and whatnot, yes, I think this Congress would act.”); id. at 16–17 (Kennedy, J.) (“[F]rom the standpoint 
of the dynamics of Federalism, it does seem to me that there is something very powerful to the point 
that if your argument is accepted, the States are being told either create your own Exchange, or we’ll 
send your insurance market into a death spiral.”); id. at 20 (Ginsburg, J.) (“I have never seen anything 
like this where [a state that allows the federal government to set up its Exchange] get[s] these disastrous 
consequences.”); id. at 13 (Breyer, J.) (“[I]f you want to go into the context, at that point it seems to 
me your argument really is weaker . . . The Exchanges fall apart, nobody can buy anything on them.”); 
id. at 53 (Alito, J.) (pointing out that the Court has often stayed its mandate to avoid “disruptive 
consequences” of a decision); Id. at 15 (Sotomayor, J.) (“In those States that don’t—their citizens don’t 
receive subsidies, we’re going to have the death spiral that this system was created to avoid.”); id. at 
34–35 (Kagan, J.) (“[U]nder your theory, if Federal Exchanges don’t qualify as Exchanges established 
by the State, that means Federal Exchanges have no customers.”). 
217. See infra notes 218–25 and accompanying text. 
218. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 216, at 14–17 (Sotomayor, J.) (Kennedy, J.). 
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interpret the statute to avoid what he called a “serious constitutional 
question.”219  The constitutional objection does not seem strong.  Indeed, in 
NFIB v. Sebelius, the Court allowed states to opt out of the Affordable Care 
Act’s expansion of Medicaid.220  The Court held that it would be coercive to 
deny funding for the entire Medicaid program to a state that opted out, but the 
Court explicitly permitted the federal government to withhold funding for the 
expansion to states that opted out.221  This colloquy is better explained as an 
attempt to wrestle with—and avoid if possible—the acknowledged disastrous 
consequences of petitioners’ reading of the statute. 
Even Justices Scalia and Alito, the two strongest proponents of a literal 
reading of the statute, wrestled with the consequences of the statute.222  Justice 
Scalia said, “If the consequences are as disastrous as you say . . . I think this 
Congress would act.”223  Justice Alito suggested that the consequences of an 
adverse ruling could be mitigated by “stay[ing] the mandate until the end of this 
tax year” if the Court ruled subsidies unavailable on the federal Exchange.224  
As one prominent commentator stated at the time, “There was nothing in those 
remarks, by either of those two Justices, to indicate that they were questioning 
whether the predictions of a serious social problem would, in fact, follow the 
ruling against a nationwide subsidy system.”225 
 
219. Id. at 18 (Kennedy, J.).  Interestingly, when counsel for the petitioners pointed out that the 
government had not advanced a constitutional argument, Justice Kennedy quipped, “Sometimes we 
think of things the government doesn’t.”  Id. at 17. 
220. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 585 (2012). 
221. Id.  Indeed, this point was made at oral argument, Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, King, 
135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14-114), though Justice Kennedy did not seem convinced by it.  Id. at 18 
(Kennedy, J.). 
222. See infra notes 223–25 and accompanying text. 
223. Transcript of Oral Argument at 54–55, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14-114).  It is interesting 
to consider what Congress would and would not do.  Both houses of Congress were under Republican 
control at that point; numerous repeal votes were held, and in fact in January 2016, the Congress sent 
a repeal bill to President Obama’s desk, which he promptly vetoed.  Alex Moe, Congress Sends 
Obamacare Repeal to President for First Time, NBC NEWS (Jan. 6, 2016, 11:50 AM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/congress-send-obamacare-repeal-president-n491316 
[https://perma.cc/2RX7-N6KC].  Indeed, as of this writing in 2018, with Republicans controlling both 
houses of Congress and the White House, repeal has proven elusive.  If the Court held subsidies 
unavailable, it would perhaps have been easier to harm the Obamacare regime passively by refusing to 
enact a “fix.”  However, Republicans have as yet been unable to actively sabotage the law. 
224. Transcript of Oral Argument at 53, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14-114). 
225. Lyle Denniston, Argument Analysis: Setting up the Private Debate on the ACA, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 4, 2015, 1:43 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/03/argument-analysis-
setting-up-the-private-debate-on-the-aca/ [https://perma.cc/W3VN-P56B].  
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The opinion in the case itself grapples with consequences.226  By starting 
with five pages detailing the history of health reform and the interdependence 
of the guaranteed issue, community rating, and individual mandate, the opinion 
not only describes the statutory scheme but demonstrates that the scheme falls 
apart if the statute is interpreted in a way that eviscerates part of its reforms.227  
Indeed, in refusing Chevron deference to the IRS ruling on the availability of 
subsidies on the federal Exchange, the Court notes that the subsidies 
“involve[e] billions of dollars in spending each year and affect[] the price of 
health insurance for millions of people,” along the way to concluding that the 
question is one of “deep economic and political significance.”228 
Perhaps most strikingly, the Court cites both the Urban Institute and Rand 
Corporation studies for the number of people who would be forced off health 
insurance and the percentage of premium increase for the those who manage to 
keep their insurance.229  The Court concludes that it is “implausible that 
Congress meant the Act to operate in this manner.”230  This argument seems to 
go to the intent of Congress, or to the statutory scheme.  Further, it seems likely 
that the Court also chose a reading of the statute designed to avoid a truly 
disastrous consequence. 
C. Conclusion 
King v. Burwell presents a thorny interpretive problem.  The language 
“established by the State” seems clear, yet the structure and purpose of the act 
(at least at a broad level of generality) raised a serious interpretive question.231  
Further, other provisions of the Act appear not to make sense if the narrowest 
linguistic meaning of the “established by the State” provision is followed.232  
Thus, the Court reached a result designed to harmonize the provision at issue 
with the structure and purpose of the Act.233  It is the clearest recent example of 
a Supreme Court opinion relying on purpose, nearly to the contradiction of plain 
text.  For a court that has preached textualism for decades, the decision appears 
 
226. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2493–94. 
227. Id. at 2485–89. 
228. Id. at 2489 (internal quotations omitted). 
229. Id. at 2493–94 (citing SALTZMAN & EIBNER, supra note 210; BLUMBERG, BUETTGENS, & 
HOLAHAN, supra note 210). 
230. Id. at 2494. 
231. See Katzmann, supra note 199, at 394. 
232. Id. 
233. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2490–96.  
 
CEDRONE_FINAL_03DEC19 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/3/2019  7:50 PM 
2019] SUPREME SILENCE AND PRECEDENTIAL PRAGMATISM 77 
 
 
out of step.  While it is tempting to view it as one-off, the decision in King is 
best seen as a pragmatic choice to reach what appears to be a correct result that 
does the least violence to a statutory scheme in a very difficult case. 
IV. KING V. BURWELL AS RECEIVED BY THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 
In the two years following its issue, some seventy-two federal courts of 
appeals decisions have cited King v. Burwell.234  While a small number of these 
decisions relate to the law of the Affordable Care Act or to administrative law 
topics, the vast majority deal with the proper reading of a the federal statutes at 
issue.235  This group of cases reflects the diverse approaches one would expect 
from American statutory interpretation jurisprudence: courts generally rely on 
text as the starting point, looking to context, statutory structure and scheme, 
legislative purpose, and legislative history in varying proportions depending on 
the clarity of the evidence and the predilections of the judges on the panel.236  
Three major trends involving King arise from the cases.  First, there is a 
group of cases that uses scheme and purpose as in King to give effect to text 
that is unclear, to broaden the meaning of seemingly clear text, and even, upon 
occasion, to trump the meaning of seemingly clear text.237  Second, at the other 
end of the spectrum, there is a small group of cases that reject King’s reliance 
on scheme and purpose to trump or even illuminate the meaning of statutory 
text.238  Some of these cases engage in philosophical and jurisprudential 
jousting, but at little cost: it’s easy to affirm textualist principles in the context 
of a case easily resolved by text.239  The remainder of cases, which are the vast 
majority, pose little conflict between text and purpose: they use context, 
scheme, and purpose to reinforce a semantically plausible reading of the text.240 
While King is not the harbinger of a new day in statutory interpretation, it 
demonstrates beyond dispute that text and purpose remain the central tools of 
American statutory interpretation.241  In legal process terms, courts that (tell 
themselves they) hew most closely to text and reject King’s model of context, 
scheme and purpose as interpretive guides are those that distinguish most 
 
234. See infra notes 246–47 and accompanying text.  
235. See infra notes 249–50 and accompanying text. 
236. See infra Sections IV.B–D. 
237. See infra Section IV.B. 
238. See infra Section IV.C. 
239. See infra Section IV.C. 
240. See infra Section IV.D. 
241. See infra Section IV.D. 
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sharply between the roles of courts and the roles of legislatures in giving effect 
to statutes.242  Those that engage in King-like reasoning view courts as 
complementary partners to legislatures in making meaning of the words in 
statutes.243 
A. A Note About Method 
This Article considers all federal court of appeals cases citing King issued 
within a two-year period after the Supreme Court announced its decision.244  
Selecting this time period has advantages.  First, it is a sufficient period for 
litigants and courts to absorb the King decision and to consider its application 
in a wide variety of legal contexts, as will be clear from the discussion below.  
Second, none of these cases have pending certiorari petitions to the Supreme 
Court.245  Thus each of these cases has by now made its complete contribution 
to the law. 
Cases were identified through the “Citing References” feature on Westlaw 
and the Shepard’s feature on Lexis Advance.246  This identified seventy-two 
unique cases.247  Each case was then analyzed for the purpose of determining 
 
242. See infra Section IV.C. 
243. See infra Section IV.B. 
244. As will be clear from the discussion below, this Article does not attempt quantitative 
analysis of the decisions.  While it would be possible to code the decisions in various ways and perform 
statistical analyses on them, a qualitative approach to the cases facilitates a more nuanced 
understanding of the interpretive moves courts are making.  For an interesting discussion of the merits 
of quantitative vs. qualitative approaches to sets of cases, see Gregory Klass, Empiricism and Privacy 
Policies in the Restatement of Consumer Contract Law, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 45, 45, 96, 101 (2019) 
(claiming that results of certain quantitative studies used in the Restatement of Consumer Contract 
Law cannot be replicated and arguing that qualitative study of the cases reveals a more accurate picture 
of the law). 
245. Indeed, the last cert petition, relating to In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litig., 
818 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. dismissed, 139 S. Ct. 2050 (2019), was dismissed while this Article 
was in production. 
246. See WESTLAW, www.westlaw.com; LEXIS, www.lexisnexis.com.  I consulted these 
websites a final time and saved to my computer the list of citing references from both sources on June 
15, 2018. 
247. Interestingly, four cases were identified by Lexis that were not identified by Westlaw.  
These cases are Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys. v. Burwell, 816 F.3d 48 (4th Cir. 2016); Assocs. Against 
Outlier Fraud v. Huron Consulting Grp., Inc., 817 F.3d 433 (2d Cir. 2016); Knox Creek Coal Corp. v. 
Sec’y of Labor, 811 F.3d 148 (4th Cir. 2016); and United States v. Chafin, 808 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 
2015).  I have excluded Knox Creek Coal from the set and do not count it among the seventy-two 
because the opinion in that case cites the Fourth Circuit and not the Supreme Court opinion in King v. 
Burwell.  811 F.3d at 158 (citing King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 363 (4th Cir. 2014) for the proposition 
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why King v. Burwell was cited and what interpretive moves the courts made.  
From there, the cases were divided into the groups identified in the introduction 
to this Section. 
Seventeen of the seventy-two cases do not pertain primarily to statutory 
interpretation and are not considered in the Sections that follow.  These 
seventeen cases fall into three groups.  The first is a group of five cases that cite 
King v. Burwell for its description of the Affordable Care Act and do not cite 
King for statutory interpretation principles.248  The six cases in the second group 
concern themselves with the major questions doctrine, that is the language in 
King that states that the Court should not defer to an administrative agency on 
a question of “deep economic and political significance that is central to [the] 
statutory scheme.”249  Each of these cases considers whether the matter is at 
issue is a major question.250  Finally, the six cases in the third group merely cite 
 
that the language of a statute is ambiguous if it is subject to multiple interpretations).  Digital research, 
while facilitating efficient manipulation of large data sets, is not yet perfect. 
248. These cases are Ohio v. United States, 849 F.3d 313, 315–16 (6th Cir. 2017) (rejecting 
challenge by the State of Ohio, its political subdivisions and four public universities against the 
Transitional Reinsurance Program of the ACA; citing King for general description of the ACA’s 
purposes and requirements); Ohio State Chiropractic Ass’n v. Humana Health Plan Inc., 647 Fed. 
Appx. 619, 623 (6th Cir. 2016) (rejecting removal of case against Medicare Advantage organization 
to federal court on the grounds that the MAO does not act under a federal agency; citing King for 
background principles on the functioning of insurance markets); Eternal Word Television Network, 
Inc. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 818 F.3d 1122, 1175–76 n.16 (11th Cir. 2016) 
(Tjoflat, J., dissenting) (rejecting RFRA and First Amendment challenge to regulations implementing 
ACA mandate to provide contraceptive coverage as part of group health insurance plans; Judge Tjoflat, 
in dissent, cites King for the proposition that the ACA contemplates each state setting up its own health 
insurance exchange); Cutler vs. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 797 F.3d 1173, 1175–76 n.1 
(D.C. Cir. 2015) (rejecting Establishment Clause challenge to ACA and finding no standing to pursue 
equal protection claims against certain ACA policies; citing King for background on the structure of 
health insurance markets and for a description of the three interlocking reforms mandated by the ACA); 
Sissel v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 799 F.3d 1035, 1035, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Rogers, 
Pillard, and Wilkins, JJ., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (denying rehearing en banc to 
Origination Clause challenge to ACA; citing King v. Burwell for background on the ACA’s three 
interlocking reforms).  
249. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015). 
250. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 402–03 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Brown, J., dissenting 
from denial of rehearing en banc) (challenge to net neutrality rules); Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch, 
818 F.3d 808, 825–26 (9th Cir. 2016) (Seabright, J., dissenting) (arguing that a provision of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act does not present a major question and thus the Board of Immigration 
Appeals’ interpretation is entitled to Chevron deference); Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch, 810 F.3d 1019, 
1031–32 (6th Cir. 2016) (Sutton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that a provision 
of the Immigration and Nationality Act with both civil and criminal consequences should not be given 
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King for a canon of construction,251 for a very basic principle of statutory 
interpretation,252 or for Justice Scalia’s memorable barb terming reasoning he 
disagreed with “interpretive jiggery-pokery.”253 
Assigning the fifty-six remaining cases to categories proved complicated.  
As has often been noted, text that is crystal-clear to one reader is ambiguous to 
another.254  And courts are not above manipulating text to find ambiguity.255  To 
sidestep the inevitable difficulties of attempting to second-guess the courts’ 
 
Chevron deference; citing the major questions doctrine as described in King as an example of a 
categorical exception to Chevron); ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. ITC, 810 F.3d 1283, 1302–03 (Fed. 
Cir. 2015) (O’Malley, J., concurring) (arguing that Chevron deference is not appropriate under the 
major questions doctrine to International Trade Commission’s claim of jurisdiction over “all incoming 
international Internet data transmissions”); Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 181 n.179 (5th Cir. 
2015) (arguing that Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents 
program (DAPA) presents a major question inappropriate for administrative action); id. at 218 (King, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that DHS is the appropriate agency to administer immigration matters); FTC v. 
Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 253 (3d Cir. 2015) (noting Wyndham’s argument that the 
FTC’s regulatory actions in the cyber security area involved major questions); Suprema v. ITC, 796 
F.3d 1338, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (O’Malley, J., dissenting) (arguing that a provision of the Tariff Act 
of 1930 is clear, and thus the International Trade Commission’s interpretation is not entitled to 
deference; citing King for the proposition that the Supreme Court has indicated that courts “should not 
nonchalantly defer to an agency’s interpretation for questions of ‘deep economic and political 
significance’”).  
251. Def. Distributed v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 838 F.3d 451, 467 (5th Cir. 2016) (Jones, J., 
dissenting) (quoting King, 135 S. Ct. at 2495) (“Congress does not . . . hide elephants in mouseholes”); 
Castañeda v. Souza, 810 F.3d 15, 53 (1st Cir. 2015) (Kayatta, J., joining) (surplusage canon not 
absolute); BancInsure, Inc. v. FDIC, 796 F.3d 1226, 1239 (10th Cir. 2015) (surplusage canon not 
absolute). 
252. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 806 F.3d 1288, 1292 (11th Cir. 2015), reh’g en 
banc granted, opinion vacated, Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 962 (11th Cir. 
2016) (“If the statutory language is clear, then our inquiry ends.”).  PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. 
Protection Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 44 (D.C. Cir. 2016), vacated and remanded, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 
2018) (en banc) similarly cited King for the general proposition that “[i]n a democracy, the power to 
make the law rests with those chosen by the people.”  Id.  The citation is offered in support of the 
panel’s holding that CFPB, as an agency, was not free to rule on a legal question in the absence of 
statutory authority.  Id. 
253. McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1095 (11th Cir. 2017). 
254. Molot, supra note 69, at 39–40; Kavanaugh, supra note 3, at 2159 (calling the ambiguity 
issue “indeterminate”). 
255. But see Ryan D. Doerfler, High-Stakes Interpretation, 116 MICH. L. REV. 523, 523 (2018) 
(arguing that courts’ tendency to see language as ambiguous in high-stakes cases is not a function of 
court’s desire to reach particular results on instrumentalist grounds but is instead a rational reaction 
when stakes are heightened; put differently, courts are justifiably more cautious about the meaning of 
text as an epistemic matter when the consequences of their decisions are heightened). 
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conclusions, this article accepts the courts’ characterizations of the language 
they are interpreting.  If the court claims ambiguity in the statute, this analysis 
examines which tools the court uses to find ambiguity: whether linguistic and 
semantic, or contextual and purposive.  At times, divided panels of the appeals 
courts have disagreed about whether text is clear or ambiguous.256  In those 
instances, this article presents those disagreements in the discussions below 
(often in the footnotes).  To be sure, the choice not to devote substantial space 
to independent analysis of whether the courts accurately characterize the 
language of cases risks missing a few instances where courts may be mistaken 
or disingenuous.  However, cases in that category did not seem particularly 
common; more often, these issues were made plain through majority and 
dissenting opinions.257 
B. Cases that Embrace a Purposive Reading of Text 
Sixteen cases plus three dissents use King v. Burwell to support a reading 
of text that relies in a substantial way on the court’s view of the statutory 
scheme or purposes.258  At least three variations of this maneuver may be 
identified.  First, some cases take a step that is substantially similar to what the 
Supreme Court did in King: they find that some combination of context, 
scheme, and purpose creates ambiguity where the text read in isolation seems 
facially clear.259  Second, some cases use subsequent legislative developments 
to inform the meaning of prior legislative enactments.260  Third, and finally, 
 
256. See, e.g., Bodine v. Cook’s Pest Control Inc., 830 F.3d 1320, 1329–30 (11th Cir. 2016) 
(Martin, J., dissenting); Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 157 (2d Cir. 2015). 
257. For instance, consider Bodine v. Cook’s Pest Control, Inc., 830 F.3d 1320, 1325–28 (11th 
Cir. 2016), in which a divided panel holds that a statute providing rights to reentering veterans in the 
employment context does not require invalidation of an arbitration clause.  Both the majority, id. at 
1327, and the dissenting judge, id. at 1329–32, claim that text, context, and purpose support their 
respective readings of the statute.  I have not attempted to arbitrate which side is correct in such cases; 
rather, both are unremarkable for purposes of understanding the application of King because the case 
does not present a conflict between text and purpose in any form.  Instead, it seems to me, the case is 
best understood as one in which language and context are flexible enough to be read in different ways, 
and the majority and dissent would decide the case based mostly upon different visions of legislative 
priority and meaning. 
258. See infra Sections IV.B.1–3. 
259. See infra Section IV.B.1. 
260. See infra Section IV.B.2. 
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some cases use context, scheme, and/or purpose to illuminate the meaning of 
text that is unclear or ambiguous.261  
1. Cases in Which Context, Scheme, and Purpose Appear to Override Text 
The five cases described in this Section embody the strongest form of 
purposive interpretation of any cases in this set.  All of them consider statutory 
purpose, using in turn, the scheme and structure of the Act, statutory 
declarations of purpose, and (in four cases) legislative history.262  Each of these 
cases claims to respect Congress’ intent in enacting the statute at issue.263 
Perhaps the clearest, though certainly not the only, instance of a court 
departing from the apparent plain meaning of a statutory term occurs in Owner-
Operator Independent Drivers Association. v. United States Department of 
Transportation.264  In this case, the Seventh Circuit considered pragmatic 
consequences, statutory purpose, scheme, and legislative history in upholding 
Department of Transportation rules that, in part, mandate electronic logging 
devices (ELD) in most interstate commercial motor vehicles.265  
The plaintiffs, a trade organization, challenged the rule on the grounds that 
it did not fulfill the statutory command that ELDs be “capable of recording a 
driver’s hours of service and duty status accurately and automatically.”266  
Petitioners argued that the term “automatically” requires a device that is 
“entirely automatic; no human involvement is permitted.”267  The court rejected 
 
261. See infra Section IV.B.3. 
262. Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 830 F.3d 470, 479–80 (7th Cir. 2016), affirmed, 138 S. 
Ct. 816 (2018); Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 840 F.3d 879 (7th Cir. 
2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2246 (2017); In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litig., 818 F.3d 
98, 105 (2d Cir. 2016) cert. dismissed, 139 S. Ct. 2050 (2019); In re Trump Entm’t Resorts, 810 F.3d 
161, 167–68 (3d Cir. 2016); G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist., 802 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 2015).  Denials 
of certiorari will be noted for all cases discussed in this Section because they are “particularly relevant.”  
See THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 10.7 (Columbia Law Review Ass’n, 
Harvard Law Review Ass’n, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, and Yale Law Journal eds., 20th 
ed. 2015).   
263. Owner-Operator Indep., 840 F.3d at 888; In re Tribune, 818 F.3d at 120; In re Trump 
Entm’t Resorts, 810 F.3d at 171; Rubin, 830 F.3d at 483; Ligonier Valley, 802 F.3d at 616–17. 
264. 840 F.3d 879. 
265. Id. at 883.  The long history of Congress’ attempts to get the agency to issue a rule requiring 
electronic monitoring devices on long-haul trucks, the agency’s responses, and various rebukes of the 
agency by the D.C. and Seventh Circuits is recounted in the background section of the opinion.  See 
id. at 885–87.  
266. Id. at 887 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 31137(f)(1)(A)). 
267. Id. (emphasis in original). 
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this interpretation of the term, first penning two paragraphs making the 
pragmatic and prudential argument that devices that require no human 
interaction whatever are not feasible and are undesirable.268  Further, and most 
relevant here, the court termed itself “confident that Congress did not intend” 
the word “automatically” to entirely preclude human interaction with ELDs.269  
The court cited King for the proposition that it should “construe statutes, not 
isolated provisions” and proceeded to consider “other parts of the statute” 
which provide “context” that undermined plaintiffs’ reading of the term 
“automatic.”270  For instance, the statute directs that the agency ensure that 
ELDs will not be used to harass drivers and consider ELD’s implications for 
drivers’ privacy.271  From these provisions, the court concluded that Congress 
meant for the agency to “balance competing goals” of accuracy and privacy 
when deciding which ELDs the rules would permit.272  Finally, the court 
deployed two additional arguments: that the Congressional language came from 
a vacated prior version of the agency rule that defined “automatically” as 
meaning something less than entirely automatic, and that if Congress had 
intended to change the meaning of “automatic” between the prior, vacated 
agency rule and the current statute, it would have done so explicitly, without 
“hid[ing] elephants in mouseholes.”273  
These arguments are sensible, and square with the long dialogue between 
Congress, the courts, and the agency about how best to regulate long-distance 
truck drivers and how to avoid fraud in paper driver logs.274  However, it is 
notable that they stretch the meaning of the word “automatically” to include 
functions that must be performed by the driver, for example, recording changes 
of status from “off-duty” to “on-duty, not driving.”275  This expansion of 
meaning, and the concomitant blessing of agency rules reflecting the expansion, 
 
268. Id. at 887–88 (noting the difficulty, for example, of a fully automatic device that would 
“record a driver’s change from ‘off duty’ to ‘on-duty, not driving,’” and rejecting constant video 
surveillance and bio-monitoring devices as “breathtakingly invasive”). 
269. Id.  
270. Id. (citing King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015)). 
271. Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 31137(a)(2), (d)(2)). 
272. Id. 
273. Id. at 888–89. 
274. See id. 
275. Id. at 888.  It is worth noting that the opinion cites King a second time for the unremarkable 
proposition that ambiguity in a statutory term implies a delegation to the relevant agency to “fill in the 
statutory gaps.”  Id. at 889–90 (citing King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488). 
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is based on the court’s view of statutory purpose buttressed by statutory 
scheme.276 
The Second Circuit made a similar move in the course of construing a safe 
harbor provision of the Bankruptcy Code in In re Tribune Company Fraudulent 
Conveyance Litigation.277  Section 544 of the Bankruptcy Code, in general 
terms, permits a Chapter 11 trustee in bankruptcy to recover certain funds 
transferred to other parties by the debtor before filing bankruptcy.278  This 
powerful avoidance power is limited by § 546(e), which provides a safe harbor, 
preventing a trustee from avoiding certain securities-related payments made to 
defined participants in the financial markets.279  The payments at issue include 
margin payments, settlement payments or transfers in connection with a 
securities contract, commodity contract, or forward contract; the protected 
entities consist largely of financial institutions.280  Section 546(e) provides a 
federal cause of action for avoidance of these payments only when there is 
intentional fraud, i.e. when the payments are made with “actual intent to hinder, 
delay, or defraud” creditors, but it provides no federal cause of action for 
constructive fraud.281 
Noting that § 546(e) by its terms applies only to claims brought by the 
bankruptcy trustee, creditors in the Tribune bankruptcy claimed a power to 
bring state law constructive fraud claims (i.e. non-intentional fraud claims) 
notwithstanding the limits of § 546(e) (and other sections of the bankruptcy 
code).282  The Second Circuit rejected this claim, finding that § 546(e) 
 
276. Id. at 887–88. 
277. 818 F.3d 98, 105 (2d Cir. 2016).  
278. 11 U.S.C. § 544 (2012). 
279. 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) (2012).   
280. Id. 
281. 11 U.S.C. §§ 546(e), 548(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
282. In re Tribune Co., 818 F.3d at 105 (Creditors argued that they were not barred by the 
automatic stay or by § 546(e)).  For the sake of simplicity, this discussion avoids an important 
complexity here.  There is a question whether the creditors’ state law constructive fraud claims survive 
the automatic stay provision.  Id. at 105.  Creditors argue that the claims are prevented during the stay 
but revert back to the creditors after the stay is completed.  Id. at 114.  This question turns on the 
“debated and somewhat metaphysical” question about who owns the claims.  Id. at 116.  The claims 
belong either to the creditors or to the debtor’s estate.  Either way, the trustee has power to bring the 
claims within the allowed period.  Id. at 106–07.  If they remain property of the creditors, it seems 
possible that they can revert back after the stay expires or is lifted.  Id. at 114.  If the claims become 
property of the debtor’s estate, the notion that they revert back to the creditors after the expiration or 
lifting of the stay seems “counterintuitive” to the court because the trustee is empowered to make 
decisions about which claims to bring.  Id. at 117.  Because this issue is unsettled and was unsettled at 
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preempted such power in the hands of creditors as well as trustees.283  In 
reaching this holding, the court looked to “language, legislative history, and 
purposes.”284  The court noted that the purpose of § 546(e) is to provide 
certainty as to completed securities transactions, speed to allow parties to adjust 
to market conditions, finality as to investors’ stakes in firms, and stability of 
financial markets.285  The court held that allowing creditors to bring claims that 
were forbidden to the trustee undermined these statutory purposes.286  Citing 
King, the court warned against “putting lynchpin reliance on the word ‘trustee’” 
and emphasized the importance of considering context and statutory scheme.287  
Thus, the court found that creditors were also prohibited by § 546(e) from 
asserting the claims described in the section.288  This move looks a great deal 
like applying “established by the State” to the federal exchange—precisely 
what the Supreme Court did in King. 
The Third Circuit interpreted another provision of Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy code in a primarily contextual manner in In re Trump 
Entertainment Resorts, and in fact admitted that it was not interpreting the code 
provision at issue in “the most natural reading.”289  This bankruptcy, filed on 
 
the time § 546(e) was added to the Code, the meaning of § 546(e) with respect to state law constructive 
fraud claims is ambiguous.  Id. at 118–19.   
283. Id. at 124. 
284. Id. at 118–19. 
285. Id. at 119. 
286. Id. 
287. Id. at 120 (citing King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015)).  As noted above, supra 
note 280, further appellate review is not exhausted in this case.  Creditors sought certiorari on 
September 9, 2016.  Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams. et. al. v. Robert R. McCormick Found. et. al., No. 
16-317 (U.S. Sept. 9, 2016).  On April 3, 2018, Justices Kennedy and Thomas issued a statement 
deferring the disposition of the petition “for an additional period of time” to allow the lower courts to 
consider the Supreme Court’s decision in Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., 138 
S. Ct. 883 (2018), and specifically noting that the lower courts “could decide whether relief from 
judgment is appropriate given the possibility that there might not be a quorum” at the Supreme Court 
to decide the case.  Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams. et. al. v. Robert R. McCormick Found. et. al., 138 
S. Ct. 1162, 1163 (2018) (Kennedy and Thomas, JJ., statement respecting the petition for certiorari).  
In Merit Management, the Court unanimously held that that § 546(e) permitted avoidance of transfers 
to financial institutions where the covered financial entities are merely intermediaries and not the real 
party in interest.  138 S. Ct. at 888.  The Court did not consider the question of who is empowered to 
bring such claims.  The Second Circuit has not yet ruled on how it would apply the Merit Management 
decision to this case. 
288. In re Tribune Co., 818 F.3d at 124. 
289. In re Trump Entm’t Resorts, 810 F.3d 161, 169 n.32 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing King, 135 S. Ct. 
at 2489).  
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September 9, 2014, involved the Trump Taj Mahal casino in Atlantic City, New 
Jersey.290  Following the filing, the debtor sought to reject an expired collective 
bargaining agreement (CBA) with a labor union under the provisions of 11 
U.S.C. § 1113.291  Section 1113 permits a debtor to “reject a collective 
bargaining agreement” after the bankruptcy court agrees that certain procedural 
and substantive conditions have been met; it further forbids debtors from 
“terminat[ing] or alter[ing] any provisions of a collective bargaining 
agreement” without meeting its terms.292  The statute does not say whether it 
applies to expired CBAs or to the obligations imposed on an employer to 
maintain the status quo following expiration under the National Labor Relations 
Act (NLRA).293  The labor union claimed that the provisions of § 1113 do not 
apply to expired CBAs and that the debtor could only avoid its status quo 
obligations by following the stricter procedures of the NLRA.294 
In considering whether § 1113 applies to expired CBAs, the Third Circuit 
refused “to embark, as the parties [did], on a hyper-technical parsing of the 
words and phrases” of the provision, or to “focus on a meaning that may seem 
plain when considered in isolation.”295  In a footnote, the court quoted King v. 
Burwell’s statement that “[i]n this instance, the context and structure of the 
[statute] compel us to depart from what would otherwise be the most natural 
reading of the pertinent statutory phrase.”296 
Following this path, based on “the situation in which § 1113 was enacted” 
and an “examin[ation] of the provision in the context of the Bankruptcy Code 
as a whole,” the court held § 1113 allows a debtor to reject the continuing 
obligations imposed by an expired CBA.297  The Third Circuit noted that § 1113 
was enacted to overturn a Supreme Court decision that held that CBAs were 
rendered unenforceable when a debtor filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition.298  
 
290. Id. at 164–65. 
291. Id. at 163.  As the Third Circuit noted, the National Labor Relations Act, 29 
U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), prevents an employer from altering the status quo with respect to “mandatory 
subjects of bargaining” even after a CBA expires.  Id. at 168. 
292. 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (2012). 
293. Id.  
294. In re Trump Entm’t Resorts, 810 F.3d. at 164.  
295. Id. at 169. 
296. Id. at 169 n.32.  
297. Id. at 169, 173.  The court cited King for the proposition that a phrase which may seem plain 
in isolation may be ambiguous in context.  Id. at 167, n.22. 
298. Id. at 169–70 (noting that § 1113 was enacted to overturn the second holding in NLRB v. 
Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984)).  
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In response to that decision, Congress imposed the procedural and substantive 
safeguards of § 1113, to ensure that “when the NLRA yields to the Bankruptcy 
Code, it does so only for reasons that will permit the debtor to stay in 
business.”299  The court then embarked on a review of evidence in the case 
demonstrating that the debtor needed to avoid its CBA obligations in order to 
stay in business.300  The court further argued that its holding was “consistent 
with the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code which gives debtors latitude to 
restructure their affairs,” citing King’s admonition that “[w]e cannot interpret 
federal statutes to negate their own stated purposes.”301 
This brief case is remarkable.  The Third Circuit explicitly admits that it is 
not following the “most natural reading” of the phrase “collective bargaining 
agreement” in holding that it includes continuing obligations imposed by the 
NLRA after a collective bargaining agreement expires.302  Congress could 
easily have used the term “collective bargaining obligations” if it wished to 
specify something broader than the contractual agreement between the parties.  
The result is a purposive interpretation that is in significant tension with text. 
In Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the Seventh Circuit used context and 
purpose, though not legislative history, to narrow the reach of a provision of the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA).303  The case grew out of an attempt 
by U.S. citizens injured in a Hamas suicide bombing in Jerusalem to execute 
on a $71.5 million dollar default judgment against the Islamic Republic of Iran 
that they obtained in 1997.304  The plaintiffs’ attempts at executing on this 
judgment sprawl across two decades, across the country, and across the pages 
of federal case reporters.305  
In its 2016 decision, the Seventh Circuit considered whether the plaintiffs 
could execute against Persian antiquities that belong to Iran but were in the 
possession of two Chicago institutions: the University of Chicago and the Field 
Museum of Natural History.306  One of the plaintiffs’ arguments was that the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA) permits execution on a foreign state’s 
 
299. Id. at 171. 
300. Id. at 171–72. 
301. Id. at 173–74 n.60 (citing King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2492–93 (2015)).  
302. Id. at 168–69 n.32. 
303. 830 F.3d 470, 479–80 (7th Cir. 2016), affirmed, 138 S. Ct. 816 (2018). 
304. Id. at 473. 
305. For a mere snippet, see id. at 473.  The subsequent appellate history on Lexis contains 
eighty-four items as of October 20, 2019. 
306. Id.  
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property that is “used for a commercial activity in the United States.”307  The 
Seventh Circuit admitted that the statute does not, by its terms, require that the 
foreign sovereign itself put the assets to commercial use.308  Nonetheless, it read 
this statutory provision to “require commercial use by the foreign state itself, 
not a third party.”309  Based on this view of the statutory rule, the court easily 
concluded that Iran did not itself engage in commercial use and the assets 
should be shielded from judgments.310   
In reaching its holding, the court relied on the holdings of three other 
circuits and made a King-type context argument to narrow the reach of the 
provision.311  The Rubin court also relied on the declaration of purpose codified 
in the statute itself; this declaration refers to the international law norm that 
“states are not immune from the jurisdiction of foreign courts insofar as their 
commercial activities are concerned, and their commercial property may be 
levied upon for the satisfaction of judgments rendered against them in 
connection with their commercial activities.”312  The Rubin court read this 
language as an instruction that execution immunity exists only where the 
foreign state itself has used its property for commercial purposes.313 
As if these examples are not clear enough, perhaps a clearer instance of a 
court setting aside the textual meaning of the statute for a contextual solution is 
found in the Third Circuit’s decision in G.L. v. Ligonier Valley School 
District.314  This case involved a child’s claim for compensatory education 
under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).315  The court 
 
307. Id.  The Supreme Court did not grant certiorari on this issue and therefore did not consider 
it in its review.  Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 137 S. Ct. 2326 (2017) (granting certiorari only as 
to one question presented by the petition); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Rubin v. Islamic Republic of 
Iran, 138 S. Ct. 816 (No. 16-534).  The issue described in the text did not create a circuit split, Rubin, 
830 F.3d at 481.  The Court noted that it was granting cert. on a different issue “to resolve a split among 
the Courts of Appeals.”  Rubin, 138 S. Ct. at 821. 
308. Rubin, 830 F.3d at 479 (observing that “[t]he passive voice focuses on an event that occurs 
without respect to a specific actor”) (citing Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 572 (2009)). 
309. Id. at 473. 
310. Id.  
311. Id. at 479–80 (citing King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) for the proposition that 
the meaning or ambiguity of certain words or phrases only becomes apparent when they are placed in 
context and examining a provision that extends jurisdictional immunity). 
312. Id. at 479 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1602). 
313. Id. 
314. 802 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 2015). 
315. Id. at 604. 
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confronted an apparent conflict between two limitations provisions.316  The 
first, a statute of limitations found at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C), provides that a 
due process complaint under the statute must be filed by the parents “no more 
than two years after the parents ‘knew or should have known’ about the alleged 
deprivation.”317  In other words, a complaint must be filed within two years of 
the discovery of the deprivation.318  The second, a prefatory provision found at 
20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(B), describes a due process complaint as alleging “an 
injury that occurred not more than two years before the reasonable discovery 
date.”319  The court sketched out four ways this second provision could impact 
the first:   
Does § 1415(b)(6)(B) limit compensatory education to injuries 
occurring two years before the filing of the complaint, even if 
earlier injuries are claimed within two years of their reasonable 
discovery, as urged by Appellant Ligonier Valley School 
District Authority?  Does it limit compensatory education to 
injuries that occurred from two years before their reasonable 
discovery through the filing of the complaint, up to two years 
after that discovery, i.e., the “2+2” approach taken by the 
District Court and urged by [the plaintiff]?  Does it impose only 
a pleading requirement, without affecting the availability of a 
remedy for timely and well-pleaded claims, as argued by 
Amici Appellees and [the plaintiff] in the alternative?  Or is it 
simply a restatement, albeit ill-phrased, of the same two-year 
statute of limitations set forth in § 1415(f)(3)(C), as asserted by 
the United States Department of Education (“DOE”)?320 
The court concluded that § 1415(b)(6)(B) was merely an inartful 
restatement of the two-year statute of limitations found in § 1415(f)(3)(C).321  
In reaching this conclusion, the court considered plain language arguments, the 
broader context of the statute, the views of the U.S. Department of Education, 
and the legislative history of the provisions at issue.322  The court cited King for 
the proposition that the “words of a statute must be read in their context and 
 
316. Id. 
317. Id. (emphasis in original) (discussing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C)). 
318. Id. (discussing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C)). 
319. Id. (emphasis in original) (discussing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(B)). 
320. Id.  
321. Id. at 604–05. 
322. Id. at 611–12. 
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with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.”323  Upon lengthy 
analysis of each of these sources, the court concluded that this was a “rare case[] 
[in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably 
at odds with the intention of its drafters.”324  The court said that IDEA “needs 
common sense revision,” but then proceeded to interpret the provision in a way 
that the court believed effected that revision and gave effect to the court’s 
perception of Congress’ intent.325 
2. Cases Where Future Legislative Enactments Change the Meaning of Text 
In two cases, courts treat the meaning of text as subject to change in view 
of future legislative enactments.326  These cases are important because they 
subordinate text to a larger view of Congressional purpose—indeed, a purpose 
not even noted in the original legislative enactment.327  
In an important case involving the National Security Agency’s bulk 
telephone metadata collection program, the Court considered the effect of the 
USA FREEDOM Act (“Freedom Act”) on statutory language that appeared to 
remain unchanged.328  The NSA relied on the authority of § 215 of the USA 
PATRIOT Act (“Patriot Act”), enacted in the shadow of the September 11th 
attacks, in undertaking bulk collection of telephone metadata involving calls 
made by and to citizens of the United States.329  On May 7, 2015, the Second 
Circuit held that the NSA’s bulk collection program exceeded the authority 
of § 215.330 
Less than one month later, on June 1, 2015, the Patriot Act expired.331  The 
very next day, June 2, 2015, Congress enacted the Freedom Act.332  The 
Freedom Act amended § 215 to make clear that it did not authorize bulk 
 
323. Id. at 611 (citing King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2492 (2015)). 
324. Id. at 624 (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)). 
325. Id. at 625–26. 
326. ACLU v. Clapper, 804 F.3d 617 (2d Cir. 2015); Mantena v. Johnson, 809 F.3d 721 (2d Cir. 
2015). 
327. Clapper, 804 F.3d at 624; Mantena, 809 F.3d at 734–36. 
328. Clapper, 804 F.3d at 622–23.  Telephone metadata “does not include the contents of a 
telephone call, but rather the details about the call, such as the length of the call, the phone number 
from which the call was made, and the phone number at which the call was received—information 
sometimes referred to as call detail records.”  Id. at 619. 
329. Id. at 618–19. 
330. Id. at 620. 
331. Id. 
332. Id. 
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collection programs; however, it also contained a provision in § 109 that 
delayed the effectiveness of these amendments for 180 days and provided that 
“[n]othing in this Act shall be construed to alter or eliminate the authority of 
the Government to obtain an order under [§ 215] as in effect prior [to the 
effective date of the amendment].”333  Having found that § 215 did not 
authorize the program, the Second Circuit considered whether it would allow 
the program to continue during the 180-day transition period.334   
The court decided that the program was authorized during the transition, 
despite the lack of explicit language from Congress saying so.335  Even though 
the language of § 215 was not changed, the court said that the statutory context 
changed, citing King v. Burwell for the proposition that § 215 had to be 
considered in the context of the subsequent Freedom Act amendments.336  
Though it previously held that § 215 did not authorize the program, the court 
concluded that its holding must give way to Congress’ intent in enacting the 
Freedom Act that the program continue during the 180-day transition.337  
Interestingly, the court was transparent in its readings of Congress’ intentions: 
the court admitted that “the present Congress cannot tell us what the Congress 
that passed the Patriot Act intended to authorize,” but nonetheless found 
Congress’ intent in passing the Freedom Act to be “clear.”338  The language 
of § 215 did not change, but its meaning and interpretation was changed by a 
subsequent enactment.339 
A second case from the Second Circuit made a similar move involving 
regulatory text.  In Mantena v. Johnson, the court considered an immigration 
regulation that required notice to a skilled foreign worker’s employer (the 
“petitioner”) when the government denies the employer’s I-140 “Immigrant 
Petition for Alien Worker,” a necessary step en route to permanent residency 
(i.e. a “green card”).340  The regulation requires notice to the “petitioner,” 
 
333. Id. 
334. Id. at 622. 
335. Id. at 623. 
336. Id. at 624 (citing King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015)) (“That Congress did not 
change the language of § 215 must be viewed in the context of the larger changes to the statute.”). 
337. Id. at 626. 
338. Id. at 623. 
339. Id. at 624. 
340. Mantena v. Johnson, 809 F.3d 721, 723, 733 (2d Cir. 2015).  The regulation at issue may 
be found at 8 C.F.R. § 205.2.  Id. at 733.  As preliminary matters, the court determined that a procedural 
challenge to the notice provision did not fall within the Immigration and Naturalization Act’s 
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however, subsequent to the enactment of the regulation, a statute was enacted 
that provided that immigration-related applications, including the I-140, would 
be portable when the immigrant changed jobs.341  In litigating the matter at the 
Second Circuit, the government took the position that the regulation did not 
change textually, and for that reason, the original employer is the only party 
who needs to be notified of the government’s decision to deny an I-140 
petition.342  However, the court held that the government acted inconsistently 
with the context of the “portability provisions” by failing to provide notice to 
either the successor employer as adopter of the petition or to the immigrant as 
the petition’s beneficiary.343  While regulations are perhaps under greater 
pressure to harmonize with a subsequent statutory amendment than are statutes, 
this case provides an example of a post-enactment statutory change altering the 
meaning and effect of a regulation.344 
3. Purpose Used to Decide Among Permissible Readings of Statutory 
Language 
In nine cases and three dissents, the courts have relied on purposive 
readings where statutory language is unclear, silent, or interpreted differently 
by various courts.345  These courts typically cite King’s admonition to consider 
context and statutory scheme.346  
In United States v. Epskamp, the defendant was convicted of possession 
with intent to distribute a controlled substance on an aircraft registered in the 
 
jurisdiction-stripping provisions, id. at 728–30, and that the immigrant had standing to raise the 
procedural challenge that notice to the employer was insufficient, id. at 730–33. 
341. Id. at 733–34. 
342. Id. at 735. 
343. Id. at 736. 
344. To be clear, the court did nothing more than hold that the agency acted inconsistently with 
the statutory scheme.  It remanded on the “precise way to read the notice regulations” for further 
development in the District Court and at the agency.  Id. at 736. 
345. In one additional case, a court relied primarily on a textual reading of statutory scheme to 
reject a narrow reliance on a single provision.  In National Mining Association v. Secretary, United 
States Department of Labor, the Eleventh Circuit considered a provision that appeared to require the 
Secretaries of Labor and Health and Human Services to jointly promulgate certain mine safety 
regulations. 812 F.3d 843, 863 (11th Cir. 2016).  However, the court did not agree that joint 
promulgation was required under the circumstances of the case, finding that such an interpretation 
“misconstrues the statutory scheme.”  Id. at 864. 
346. See, e.g., United States v. Epskamp, 832 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2016); Hernandez v. Williams, 
829 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2016). 
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United States.347  Because the aircraft flew from the Dominican Republic to 
Antwerp, Belgium, the court needed to consider whether the statute had 
extraterritorial effect.348  Notwithstanding the statute’s “less than crystalline 
drafting,” the court determined that it could “discern[] its meaning, particularly 
with the aid of broader statutory context.”349  The defendant  based his primary 
argument on a sentence in the venue provision of the statute that provided that 
the “section is intended to reach acts of manufacturing or distribution 
committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”350  The 
defendant argued that this language deliberately excluded extraterritorial 
application of a provision outlawing possession with intent to distribute.351  
Though finding this argument “not wholly without force,” the court nonetheless 
concluded that the possession-with-intent provision had extraterritorial effect 
based on the “statutory scheme,” “context of the statute,” and “authoritative 
legislative history.”352  Indeed, the court found these arguments sufficient not 
only to overcome the text of the venue provision but also the presumption 
against extraterritoriality.353 
In an additional case with “less than pellucid” language, the Third Circuit 
used context to decide that a provision of the bankruptcy code did not permit 
the trustee to aggregate small, prepetition payments to different creditors so that 
they would fall above a $5,850 threshold and consequently be “avoidable,” that 
is, recoverable by the trustee.354  While the statute provides that the “aggregate 
value” of transfers to “a creditor” could be considered, and while a bankruptcy 
rule of interpretation provides that “the singular includes the plural,” the court 
rejected the Trustee’s reading of these provisions as allowing the aggregation 
of transfers to multiple creditors, claiming that such an aggregation would 
“make[] little sense” in view of the “statutory scheme.”355  Rather than relying 
on a narrow textualist reading of these provisions, the court considered instead 
 
347. 832 F.3d at 160. 
348. Id. at 161. 
349. Id. at 162–63 (citing King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2492 (2015)); Hernandez, 829 F.3d 
at 1072 (language is “ambiguous when read in isolation,” but its meaning was made clear by “context” 
and “the statute’s remedial purpose”).  
350. Epskamp, 832 F.3d at 161 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 959(c)). 
351. Id. 
352. Id. at 162–66. 
353. Id. at 164. 
354. In re Net Pay Sols., Inc., 822 F.3d 144, 149–50 (3d Cir. 2016) (text is “less than pellucid” 
but meaning clear when “read in context”). 
355. Id. at 149–51 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 547(c)(9), 102(7)). 
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that the purpose of the provision is to “discourage litigation over relatively 
insignificant transfer amounts.”356  While the text is at best indeterminate, 
purpose and scheme allowed the court to reach a sensible interpretation of the 
statute.  
The Third Circuit reached a similar result in a case considering the meaning 
of the term “facility” in the Stored Communications Act.357  The court 
considered whether a personal computer could be considered a “facility” such 
that defendant Google violated the act by placing tracking cookies on plaintiffs’ 
web browsers.358  While conceding that the semantic meaning of “facility” is 
broad enough to encompass a personal computer, the court said that such a 
reading would undermine statutory plan, and looked to “textual 
clues . . . legislative history and enactment context” to conclude that “facility” 
is a “term of art” which excludes personal computers from coverage under the 
statute.359 
Finally, the court in Hernandez v. Williams used context and purpose to 
construe an indeterminate provision of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 
(FDCPA).360  The provision requires that a debt collector take certain action 
following “the initial communication” with a debtor; the question in the case is 
whether the action needed only be taken by the initial debt collector or whether 
each and every subsequent collector also needs to take the action.361  The court 
held that the statute applies to each and every collector who attempts to collect 
the debt; the court found the text ambiguous and based its conclusion on the 
structure of the FDCPA, its purposes, and a brief foray in to the legislative 
history of the provision.362 
 
356. Id. at 151 (citing In re Bay Area Glass, Inc., 454 B.R. 86, 90 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011)). 
357. In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement & Consumer Privacy Litig., 806 F.3d 125, 145–48 (3d 
Cir. 2015) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2701). 
358. Id. at 132–33, 145–46. 
359. Id. at 147. 
360. 829 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)). 
361. Id. 
362. Id. at 1073–80.  The court noted that resort to legislative history was “unnecessary,” but 
found its conclusion reinforced by that source.  Id. at 1079–80.  For an additional case in this genre, 
see Alamo v. United States, 850 F.3d 1349, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2017), which affirms the method the Army 
used to calculate overtime pay for EMTs.  The court found that any ambiguity or lack of clarity in the 
applicable regulations was resolved by “contextual analysis” of the Fair Labor Standards Act.  Id. at 
1352–53 (citing King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2492 (2015)). 
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In several cases, courts turn to context and scheme to reach different 
readings than have already been reached by different circuits.363  For example, 
the Second Circuit in an ERISA case found that the phrase “normal retirement 
age” could not refer to a period of five years of service for employees of an 
accounting firm.364  The court had no problem defining “normal retirement age” 
as a period of years of service, and the court recognized that the term “confers 
considerable discretion on retirement plan creators to determine normal 
retirement age.”365  However, in view of the statutory scheme, it found that so 
short a time period was not a “normal” retirement age, directly contrary to a 
Seventh Circuit decision which approved a five-year period as the “normal 
retirement age” in an ERISA plan.366  The textual conflicts in this case are not 
so sharp; nonetheless, the case provides an example of a court choosing a 
reading it believes to be faithful to the statute’s purpose in the face of a contrary 
reading by a different federal court of appeals.367 
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit has held that the meaning of an attorney fee 
provision in a class action lawsuit involving coupon settlements becomes 
“clearer” when considered in context, and the Ninth Circuit’s contrary 
interpretation of that provision becomes “less persuasive.”368  The provision in 
question set a requirement that attorney fees in coupon-settlement class actions 
must be based on a percentage of coupons actually redeemed, not the entire 
number of coupons made available.369  A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit 
held that this provision foreclosed the lodestar method of calculating attorney 
fees in coupon-settlement class action cases.370  The Seventh Circuit disagreed 
and viewed this provision as defining how to calculate attorney fees when they 
are based on coupon settlements, but looking to neighboring subsections to 
 
363. Laurent v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 794 F.3d 272, 280, 283 (2d Cir. 2015) (a reading 
in context and with a view towards place in statutory scheme results in circuit split); In re Southwest 
Airlines Voucher Litig., 799 F.3d 701, 708–09 (7th Cir. 2015) (meaning of statute becomes “clearer” 
when considered in context, and the “Ninth Circuit’s reading becomes less persuasive”). 
364. Laurent, 794 F.3d at 273. 
365. Id. at 280–81. 
366. Id. at 281–85. 
367. See generally id. 
368. In re Southwest Airlines, 799 F.3d at 708–10. 
369. Id. at 707 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1712(a) (2012)).  The statute envisions a more complex 
arrangement where the settlement includes coupons and other relief.  28 U.S.C. § 1712(b)–(c).  
370. In re Southwest Airlines, 799 F.3d at 706 (citing In re HP Inkjet Printer Litig., 716 F.3d 
1173, 1183–85 (9th Cir. 2013)). 
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govern lodestar and mixed settlements.371  Again, in a case where the language 
seemed susceptible to multiple readings, the court followed its view of what the 
statutory scheme required, even in the face of a contrary holding from a 
different circuit.372 
C. Cases that Reject a Purposive Reading of Text 
Some nine cases plus two separate opinions reject plan and purpose 
arguments in statutory construction cases.373  The concerns of these courts, 
while overlapping, fall into two basic categories.  First, these courts find 
purpose to be an imprecise interpretive guide and prefer text and linguistic 
 
371. Id. at 710.  
372. In three cases in the set, judges writing separately accuse the majority of adopting a narrow 
textualist reading that is both incorrect and that does not pay sufficient attention to the context, 
structure, and purpose of the statute as a whole.  See Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, 
Inc. v. EPA, 846 F.3d 492, 537–40 (2d Cir. 2017) (Chin, J., dissenting) (quoting Util. Air Regulatory 
Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2442 (2014)) (arguing that “[w]hen the Act is read as a whole, it is clear 
that Congress did not intend the phrase ‘navigable waters’ to be interpreted as a single water body 
because that interpretation is ‘inconsisten[t] with the design and structure of the statute as a whole’”); 
Jabateh v. Lynch, 845 F.3d 332, 344 (7th Cir. 2017) (Hamilton, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment) (arguing that “sporadic and largely unpaid help” with translation at medical 
appointments could not constitute “material support” for terrorism because that reading “loses sight” 
of “broader statutory context and purpose”); Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, 857 F.3d 1042, 1054–59 
(9th Cir. 2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that various uses of the statutory terms in different 
places in the Immigration and Naturalization Act leads to the conclusion that “a diagnosis of the disease 
of alcoholism does not, as a matter of immigration, mean that a petitioner lacks good moral character 
as a ‘habitual drunkard’”).  
 Finally, in Sijapati v. Boente, the Fourth Circuit embraced purpose to guide the meaning of 
ambiguous text in the course of deferring to an agency interpretation under Chevron.  In this case, the 
Fourth Circuit affirmed the Board of Immigration Appeals’ construction of a statute that governs the 
removability of a person who is not a citizen (in the terms of the INA, an “alien”) convicted of a crime 
of moral turpitude. 848 F.3d 210, 213 (4th Cir. 2017) (construing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)).  The 
statute provides that such a person is removable if convicted of a crime of moral turpitude within five 
years of “the date of admission.”  Id.  In this case, the defendant Sijapati was initially admitted to the 
United States in 2001, reentered the country in 2003, and was convicted of a crime of moral turpitude 
in 2007.  Id. at 213–14.  Sijapati argued that the term “the date of admission” contemplates only a 
single date of admission (because of its use of the definite article “the”) and that this date referred only 
to the date of initial admission (2001), not to the date of readmission after travel abroad (2003).  Id. at 
216.  The court found the language ambiguous and deferred to BIA’s conclusion that while “the date 
of admission” indeed referred only to one date, the date it referred to which the admission most 
proximate in time to an alien’s criminal conviction.  Id. at 216–17.  This deference was due, said the 
court, because BIA “tethered its interpretation to traditional tools of statutory interpretation,” including 
language, statutory context, statutory scheme, and purpose.  Id. at 217–18.  
373. See infra Sections IV.C.1–2. 
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canons to ground interpretation.374  Second, these courts assert that contextual 
and purposive interpretation treads too close to the legislative function.375 
1. Cases Where Purpose Arguments Do Not Overcome Text and Context 
In Michigan Flyer, LLC v. Wayne County Airport Authority, the Sixth 
Circuit considered a provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 
that forbids retaliation against “individuals” who have complained about an 
ADA violation.376  The plaintiffs in the case were transportation companies 
involved in a dispute with the local airport authority that included claims the 
airport authority violated the ADA.377  The court affirmed dismissal of the 
complaint, holding that the meaning of the term “individual,” which is not 
defined in the ADA, “is unambiguous and does not include corporations.”378  
The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the “remedial scheme of the 
ADA” requires a broad interpretation which would allow corporations to bring 
suit, thus rejecting the plaintiffs’ reliance on King v. Burwell on the grounds 
that purpose cannot be used to overcome plain, unambiguous statutory 
meaning.379   
Interestingly, the Michigan Flyer court affirmed the trial court’s 
discretionary decision not to award attorney fees because the case involved “a 
matter of first impression” that clarified law “not known to the Plaintiffs” at the 
beginning of the suit.380  While the language of the statute may have been 
“unambiguous,” it was apparently not so clear that the plaintiffs should have 
known it from the very beginning of the suit.381 
A perhaps more candid account of the court’s treatment of language can be 
found in Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd.382  In that case, the Ninth 
Circuit rejected a claim under CERCLA (the so-called Superfund statute) that 
a smelter located ten miles north of the Canadian border “deposit[ed]” 
pollutants (and therefore arranged for their “disposal”) when it emitted them 
 
374. See infra Section IV.C.1. 
375. See infra Section IV.C.2. 
376. 860 F.3d 425, 428 (6th Cir. 2017) (examining 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a)). 
377. Id. at 427. 
378. Id. at 427–28, 431. 
379. Id. at 429 n.1. 
380. Id. at 433. 
381. Id. at 427–28, 431. 
382. See 830 F.3d 975, 980–86 (9th Cir. 2016).  
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through a smoke stack.383  The court recognized the flexibility of the language 
involved, calling plaintiffs’ broad reading of the terms of the statute “reasonable 
enough,” but it found itself bound by past precedents (including an en banc 
decision) to a narrower interpretation.384  In reaching this finding, the court 
rejected plaintiffs’ invocation of CERCLA’s “broad remedial purpose” because 
the purpose argument at its highest level would result in a reading not grounded 
in text, structure, and past precedent.385 
The Seventh Circuit has similarly affirmed that “vague notions of a statute’s 
‘basic purpose’ are inadequate to overcome the words of its text regarding the 
specific issue under consideration.”386  The court held that an ERISA provision 
authorizing suits for “appropriate equitable relief” does not permit a suit against 
other insurers involving a coordination of benefits dispute because the relief 
sought is legal, not equitable.387  The court rejected the ERISA-trustee-
plaintiff’s high-level purpose argument that allowing his suit would be 
“consistent with ERISA’s underlying purposes of protecting plan assets and 
enforcing plan terms.”388 
In B.D. v. District of Columbia, the D.C. Circuit considered whether a 
provision of IDEA that allowed a cause of action to “any party aggrieved by 
the findings and decision of a hearing officer” allowed a prevailing party to 
bring a suit for enforcement of a hearing officer’s favorable decisions.389  In 
holding that enforcement suits were not authorized by this provision, the D.C. 
Circuit reached an opposite conclusion to the First and Third Circuits, which 
relied on “purpose arguments” to find such suits authorized.390  The D.C. 
Circuit, however, found both that the text and the statutory context as found in 
the “most related provision” reinforced the “plain meaning,” and thus refused 
to rely on purpose to reach a different result.391 
Wholesale rejection of purpose, even where it merely reinforces the 
apparent meaning of text, is highly unusual; indeed, only one case that does this 
can be found in the set under examination, and even then only two judges 
 
383. Id. at 978 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3)).   
384. Id. at 983.  
385. Id. at 985. 
386. Cent. States v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 840 F.3d 448, 454 (7th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). 
387. Id. at 449. 
388. Id. at 454 (citations omitted). 
389. 817 F.3d 792, 800 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (considering 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A)).  
390. Id. at 801. 
391. Id. at 802. 
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subscribe to so staunchly an anti-purpose view.392  In In re Schwartz-Tallard, 
the en banc Ninth Circuit found that a provision of the Bankruptcy Code 
permitting the debtor to recover “actual damages, including costs and attorneys’ 
fees” permitted recovery of attorney fees both to remedy a violation of the 
automatic stay as well as fees in the subsequent damages action against the 
violator.393  The majority found the provision unambiguous, and it cited King 
for the idea that its language-based holding was also supported by the statute’s 
“plan.”394  In concurrence, Judge Bea, joined by Judge O’Scannlain, asserts that 
the unambiguous meaning of the statute “should be the beginning and end of 
our analysis,” and proclaims himself “troubled” that the majority “proceeds to 
speculate” about Congress’s plan.395  Judge Bea regards that discussion as 
“unnecessary” and a violation of “judicial restraint.”396 
From these cases, one can conclude that highest-level purpose arguments 
are suspect, and that these courts are most receptive to structure and scheme 
arguments where they reinforce a linguistically plausible reading of the text.  A 
small number of judges apply textualist principles in such a way as to reject 
purposive arguments, but these judges hew to an outlier position.397 
2. Cases in Which Courts Reject Purposive Readings for Institutional Reasons 
In setting forth interpretive principles, the Fifth Circuit in In re Settoon 
Towing, LLC pointed to “plain statutory language” as the “most instructive and 
reliable indicator of Congressional intent,” and stated that judicial power is 
“constrained by our mandate to respect the role of the Legislature, and take care 
not to undo what it has done.”398  The decision in the case follows the text of 
 
392. In re Schwartz-Tallard, 803 F.3d 1095, 1101–02 (9th Cir. 2015) (Bea, J., concurring).  
393. Id. at 1097 (interpreting 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)). 
394. Id. at 1100. 
395. Id. at 1101 (Bea, J., concurring). 
396. Id. (Bea, J., concurring). 
397. See Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 850 F.3d 1045, 1048–50 (9th Cir. 2017); Berman v. 
Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 146–55 (2d Cir. 2015). 
398. 859 F.3d 340, 345 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting King v. Burwell, 135 U.S. 2480, 2496 (2015)) 
(internal quotation omitted).  The dissenting judge in Stiltner v. Hart, cited the same language objecting 
to the panel majority’s holding that a mentally incompetent defendant was entitled to equitable tolling 
of the one-year statute of limitations found in the habeas corpus statute.  657 Fed. Appx. 513, 527 (6th 
Cir. 2016).  The judge declared that “[w]e do not have the power to carve a blanket exception into 
AEDPA that does not exist, yet that is exactly what the majority does.”  Id at 528.  The answer in this 
case is not as clear as one may imagine; the courts have a long history of applying equitable doctrines 
to statutes that do not contain express provisions of same.  See Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 383–
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the statute at issue; the court cites legislative history to support its read of the 
text, but only after an extensive textual discussion.399  However, the Court’s 
invocation of King language relating to judicial power raises an institutional 
concern that purpose not be used to create law not found in the statutory text.  
This point is made clearly in several cases that cite King.400  
Judge O’Scannlain is even clearer on this point in a concurrence to the 
Ninth Circuit unpublished decision in Compton v. Dyncorp Int’l, Inc.401  Facing 
a situation where an earlier statute lodged jurisdiction for an administrative 
appeal in the district court but a later amendment to a companion statute appears 
to lodge jurisdiction in the court of appeals, the Ninth Circuit held in 1979 that 
the later statute governed, speculating that Congress’ failure to amend the 
earlier statute must have been “inadvertent.”402  Judge O’Scannlain noted that 
five subsequent courts of appeals have rejected this reasoning, and that the 
earlier statute contains language suggesting it should control where the two 
statues differ.403  Based upon these observations, Judge O’Scannlain urged that 
the 1979 decision be overruled, arguing that departing from what he considered 
to be the plain text of the earlier provision “aggrandizes judicial power and 
encourages congressional lassitude,” borrowing the phrase from Justice 
Scalia’s dissent in King.404  Put differently, the courts should not attempt to 
update a statute in light of later amendments to a cognate provision.405  Instead, 
the courts should enforce the result of the statute as written and leave to 
Congress to fix any results it doesn’t like.  
 
84 (2012) (recognizing that common law qualified immunity is available to defendants sued under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 even though the statutory text does not explicitly provide for this defense; qualified 
immunity is a “common law protections well-grounded in history and reason” that has “not been 
abrogated” by the general language of the statute). 
399. In re Settoon Towing, L.L.C., 859 F.3d 340, 352 (5th Cir. 2017).  Arguably, the citation to 
legislative history suggests that this case belongs in Section IV.D below.  However, I resist putting it 
there because the court employs clear textualist techniques and only deploys legislative history to 
confirm its read on one particular point. 
400. For an example, see In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litig., 806 F.3d 
125, 147 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing King, 135 S. Ct. at 2496). 
401. See generally 650 Fed. Appx. 550, 553–55 (9th Cir. 2016) (O’Scannlain, J., concurring). 
402. Id. at 554–55 (describing Pearce v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 603 F.2d 
763, 770 (9th Cir. 1979)).  
403. Id.  
404. Id. at 555 (quoting King, 135 S. Ct. at 2506 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
405. Id. 
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In Chu v. United States Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n, the Ninth 
Circuit followed closely the language of a statute, even when an amendment 
appeared not to make sense.406  Congress in the Dodd-Frank law inexplicably 
removed a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard of review for decisions of 
the Commodities Futures Trading Commission.407  As a result, the court held, 
it would not read that standard back into the statute, but instead applied the 
lesser “substantial evidence” standard from the Administrative Procedure 
Act.408  The court commented that this was not a “patently obvious . . . drafting 
mistake” that it could correct, and declared that it was “beyond our province to 
rescue Congress from its drafting errors, and to provide for what we think . . . is 
the preferred result.”409  
D. Cases Where Purpose and Text Do Not Conflict 
In twenty-two cases in the set, the opinions do not recognize a conflict 
between purpose and text.  Indeed, in most of these cases, there is no significant 
conflict in this area.  What a careful reader can glean from these cases is the 
methods used by the court in reaching decisions.  The cases fall rather easily 
into broad categories, and analysis of the specific case facts and rules adds little 
to the present discussion.  Consequently, the discussion below will outline the 
various approaches taken by the courts and will cite cases illustrating those 
approaches in the footnotes. 
The formulation of priority in King reads as follows: 
If the statutory language is plain, we must enforce it according 
to its terms.  But oftentimes the “meaning—or ambiguity—of 
certain words or phrases may only become evident when 
placed in context.”  So when deciding whether the language is 
plain, we must read the words “in their context and with a view 
to their place in the overall statutory scheme.”  Our duty, after 
all, is “to construe statutes, not isolated provisions.”410 
 
406. 823 F.3d 1245, 1250 (9th Cir. 2016). 
407. Id. at 1249. 
408. Id. at 1250. 
409. Id. (citations omitted).  Apparently, the court views “drafting errors” differently from 
“drafting mistakes.”  While there may be some ability to correct the latter, correcting the former raises 
institutional concerns for this panel. 
410. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (internal citations omitted) (first citing Hardt 
v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 251 (2010); then citing FDA v. Brown & Williamson, 
529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000); and then citing Graham County Soil and Water Conservation Dist. v. United 
States ex rel. Wilson, 559 U. S. 280, 290 (2010)). 
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Thirteen cases cite the second, third, or fourth sentences of this paragraph 
as a lead in to discussions that analyze plain language followed by context and 
statutory scheme, where context and scheme are used to reinforce the court’s 
view of the language.411  Five additional cases rely on this language and then 
 
411. See United States ex rel. Michaels v. Agape Senior Cmty., Inc., 848 F.3d 330, 338–39 (4th 
Cir. 2017) (holding that the Attorney General has “an absolute veto power over voluntary settlements 
in qui tam [False Claims Act] suits” by relying on plain language, context, and statutory scheme); 
Rainero v. Archon Corp., 844 F.3d 832, 837–38 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that federal courts lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction over certain state law securities class action claims based upon plain 
language and statutory scheme the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act); Nat’l Biodiesel Bd. 
v. EPA, 843 F.3d 1010, 1018–20 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (rejecting challenge to EPA application of record 
keeping requirements under the Renewable Fuel Standards program based on regulatory context and 
scheme); Humana Med. Plan, Inc. v. W. Heritage Ins. Co., 832 F.3d 1229, 1236–38 (11th Cir. 2016) 
(holding that the Medicare Act repayment provisions permit a Medicare Advantage Organization to 
sue a primary payer in the same manner as the government could; relying on language confirmed by 
context and scheme); Zero Zone, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Energy, 832 F.3d 654, 689 n.41 (7th Cir. 2016) 
(holding that the Department of Energy issued regulations properly, using the text of the provision at 
issue as a basis for understanding the statutory plan); Bodine v. Cook’s Pest Control Inc., 830 F.3d 
1320, 1322–23, 1327 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that the Uniformed Services Employment and 
Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 does not conflict with the Federal Arbitration Provision, based on 
plain language of the statute, context, and canons); In re Wright, 826 F.3d 774, 778–83 (4th Cir. 2016) 
(holding that a state prisoner challenging the “execution” of his sentence is required to file under 28 
U.S.C. § 2254 and may not invoke § 2241 based upon “the plain language of the statutes at issue and 
the purpose and context of AEDPA”); Assocs. Against Outlier Fraud v. Huron Consulting Grp., Inc., 
817 F.3d 433, 436–37 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding that term “expenses” under the fee-shifting provisions 
of the False Claims Act does not include “costs” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1), and 
the terms have different meanings based upon contextual provisions in the FCA and the manner in 
which the FCA and the Federal Rules Civil Procedure use the two terms); Cypress v. United States, 
646 Fed. Appx. 748, 752–54 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that “[t]ribe” as used in the Miccosukee 
Reserved Area Act refers to the Native American tribe itself and not individual members of the tribe 
based upon statutory context and scheme); Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Burwell, 816 F.3d 48, 
52–57 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding that Medicare Act does not provide recourse to an Article III court 
when Administrative Law Judge fails to issue a timely decision on a reimbursement claim, relying on 
statutory context and scheme of the Medicare administrative adjudication system); Greater Missouri 
Med. Pro-Care Providers, Inc. v. Perez, 812 F.3d 1132, 1137–41 (8th Cir. 2015) (holding that the 
Secretary of Labor is not authorized by the Immigration and Nationality Act to broaden the scope of 
an “aggrieved party” investigation to include other employees beyond the complainant based upon 
statutory language, purpose, and scheme); United States v. Chafin, 808 F.3d 1263, 1270–71 (11th Cir. 
2015) (concluding that the federal criminal embezzlement statute is “consistent and coherent” after 
“considering the overall statutory scheme”); DiBacco v. U.S. Army, 795 F.3d 178, 196–99 (D.C. Cir. 
2015) (holding that the CIA director is permitted to exercise discretion conferred on the Director of 
National Intelligence by the National Security Act for purposes of withholding materials from 
disclosure under Exemption 3 of the Freedom of Information Act; considering the context of the 
National Security Act regulatory scheme).  
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use context, scheme, and legislative history to support their interpretations of 
statutory language.412  Finally, in at least two cases, the “context” at issue 
includes entirely different statutes and/or principles of the common law or of 
federalism.413 
V. THE SUPREME COURT REFUSES TO REVISIT KING V. BURWELL, OR DOES 
IT? 
As one might expect, the Supreme Court has weighed in on a very small 
number of decisions that cite King.  Only two cases provide the Court an 
 
 Two cases involve more straightforward application of statutory text with little interpretation; 
here too the courts state that context and scheme are important in understanding how the provisions 
apply.  See BWP Media USA, Inc. v. Clarity Dig. Grp., LLC, 820 F.3d 1175, 1179–81 (10th Cir. 2016) 
(Digital Millennium Copyright Act); I.R. ex rel. E.N. v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 805 F.3d 
1164, 1167 (9th Cir. 2015) (IDEA). 
412. SEC v. Jensen, 835 F.3d 1100, 1114–15 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that the CEO or CFO of 
an issuer may be liable under Sarbanes-Oxley § 304 when the issuer needs to prepare an accounting 
restatement due to misconduct even if the CEO or CFO is not personally responsible for the 
misconduct; textual reading supported by legislative history); City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Transp., 796 F.3d 993, 998–1001 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that the city and county of San 
Francisco has no right of action for mandamus under the federal Pipeline Safety Act to force the 
Department of Transportation to regulate a natural gas transmission pipeline in a particular way; 
holding based on the “plain statutory language, the statutory structure, the legislative history, the 
structure of similar federal statutes, and interpretations of similar statutory provisions by the Supreme 
Court and our sister circuits”); Mechammil v. City of San Jacinto, 653 Fed. Appx. 562, 563–65 (9th 
Cir. 2016) (holding that local governments in California may not impose a special assessment or attach 
a lien to real property to collect fines or penalties for certain local ordinance violations; reading several 
statutes together and consulting legislative history of California statutes); In re Certified Question of 
Law, 858 F.3d 591, 595–604 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2016) (holding that relevant provisions of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act permit capture of certain information in connection with a FISA warrant 
after considering statutory context and legislative history); ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. ITC, 810 
F.3d 1283, 1289–99 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (holding that the term “articles” in the Tariff Act of 1930 is 
unambiguous and does not include “electronic transmissions of digital data” in view of statutory 
context and legislative history). 
413. See Ojo v. Lynch, 813 F.3d 533, 538–41 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding facially valid state court 
nunc pro tunc adoption orders merit deference in matters under provisions of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act that apply to children “adopted while under sixteen years of age”; interpreting the INA 
provision at issue in light of its own statutory context, state family law principles and principles of 
federalism); Rai v. WB Imico Lexington Fee, LLC, 802 F.3d 353, 358–64 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that 
notice to an attorney is sufficient under provisions of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act 
even where not explicitly provided by the statute in light of agency law principles). 
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opportunity to weigh in with meaningful guidance, and in both cases, it declines 
to do so.414 
In Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, the Supreme Court settled a circuit 
split over the reach of Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation protections for 
whistleblowers.415  Dodd-Frank defines a whistleblower as an individual who 
“provides . . . information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the 
[Securities and Exchange] Commission.”416  However, one subsection of the 
anti-retaliation provision protects individuals who “mak[e] disclosures that are 
required or protected [inter alia] under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.”417  
Sarbanes-Oxley does not require disclosure to be made to SEC; under Sarbanes-
Oxley, whistleblower protection is extended to all “employees” who report 
misconduct to the government or merely to an internal supervisor.418  The 
question matters because Dodd-Frank provides more generous remedies to 
whistleblowers than Sarbanes-Oxley.419  Thus, the question that divided the 
lower courts: Does the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation provisions (and their 
associated more generous remedies) apply to employees who make internal 
disclosures of misconduct but do not report that misconduct to the SEC?420  
The lower courts diverged on this question.  The Fifth Circuit held that the 
answer was “no,” that Dodd-Frank protections only apply to individuals who 
report information to the SEC and fit within the Dodd-Frank definition of 
“whistleblower.”421  Divided panels of the Second and Ninth Circuits reached 
 
414. See generally Dig. Realty Tr. Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767 (2018); Mount Lemmon Fire 
Dist. v. Guido, 139 S. Ct. 22 (2018). 
415. 138 S. Ct. at 772, 776. 
416. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012).  
417. Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A). 
418. Somers, 138 S. Ct. at 772 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)).  
419. See id. at 778. 
420. See generally Somers v. Dig, Reality Tr. Inc., 850 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2017); Berman v. 
Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2015); Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620 
(5th Cir. 2013). 
421. Asadi, 720 F.3d at 630.  This opinion, of course, does not cite King v. Burwell as it was 
issued before King was decided. 
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the opposite conclusion.422  Both the majority opinions and the dissents in the 
Second and Ninth Circuits feature prominent discussions of King.423  
The majority in the Second and Ninth Circuits follow the same essential 
analytical path.  Both opinions did not find a clear textual solution.424  Both 
majority opinions also rely on a Scalia-Garner observation that statutory 
definitions “are, after all, just one indication of meaning—a very strong 
indication, to be sure, but nonetheless one that can be contradicted by other 
indications.”425 
Having found room for interpretation, both courts conclude that applying 
the narrower Dodd-Frank definition of “whistleblower” would undermine the 
regulatory purposes of the statute, spending a considerable amount of space 
exploring the pragmatic, real-world consequences of the narrower definition.426  
The Second Circuit decision in Berman is interesting because it explicitly 
wraps itself in the mantle of King.  At the beginning of the opinion, the Second 
Circuit majority says that the case contains a “similar issue” to King, though it 
later contends that the issue in King was “far more problematic” because the 
Supreme Court in King had to decide whether a “phrase means something other 
than what it literally says,” while the court in Berman need only decide how to 
reconcile a definitional provision that appears to conflict with a substantive 
provision.427  Perhaps even more strikingly, Berman cites Church of the Holy 
Trinity as a case in which the Court refused to apply the express terms of a 
statute because they yielded a result “unlikely to have been intended by 
Congress.”428  The Ninth Circuit’s citation of King in Somers is more discreet; 
the court relies on King for the less-controversial idea that “terms can have 
different operative consequences in different contexts.”429  
 
422. Somers, 850 F.3d at 1050 (concluding that the statute extends protections to individuals 
who report internally and concluding that SEC regulations taking the same position are entitled to 
deference); Berman, 801 F.3d at 146 (finding the statute ambiguous and extending Chevron deference 
to SEC regulation). 
423. Somers, 850 F.3d at 1049; id. at 1051 (Owens, J., dissenting); Berman, 801 F.3d at 146, 
150, 155; id. at 155–56, 159–60 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). 
424. Somers, 850 F.3d at 1049–50 (Dodd-Frank’s definitional provision “should not be 
dispositive”); Berman, 801 F.3d at 155 (finding the Dodd-Frank language ambiguous). 
425. Somers, 850 F.3d at 1049 (quoting SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 228); Berman, 801 
F.3d at 154 (quoting the same language). 
426. Somers, 850 F.3d at 1049–50; Berman, 801 F.3d at 151–52. 
427. Berman, 801 F.3d. at 146, 150. 
428. Id. at 150. 
429. Somers, 850 F.3d at 1049. 
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The dissents in the Second and Ninth circuit cases contest any number of 
points, but they are most interesting for their explicit rejections of King.430  In 
his very first sentence, Judge Jacobs in Berman accuses the majority of 
“alter[ing] a federal statute by deleting three words (‘to the Commission’) from 
the definition of ‘whistleblower’ in the Dodd-Frank Act.”431  He accuses the 
majority of relying “almost wholly” on King and contends that the case should 
not be understood as a “not a wholesale revision of the Supreme Court’s 
statutory interpretation jurisprudence, which for decades past has consistently 
honored plain text over opportunistic inferences about legislative history and 
purpose.”432  Judge Jacobs argues that the Supreme Court decided King as it did 
to avert disaster, and the present case would hardly result in disaster if the 
language of the whistleblower definition was held to be controlling.433  In 
Somers, Judge Owen’s dissent minces even fewer words: “In my view, we 
should quarantine King and its potentially dangerous shapeshifting nature to 
the specific facts of that case to avoid jurisprudential disruption on a cellular 
level.  Cf.  John Carpenter’s The Thing (Universal Pictures 1982).”434 
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, reversed the 
judgment of the Ninth Circuit and held, based on the definition provision, that 
Dodd-Frank protections and remedies only apply to “whistleblowers” who 
report misconduct to the SEC.435  The Court’s decision rests on textual 
justifications, beginning by admonishing that explicit statutory definitions must 
be followed.436  The Court reinforces its textual reasoning with what it perceives 
to be the purpose of Dodd-Frank: to motivate individuals with knowledge of 
securities violations to report them to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission.437  The Court then considers various consequences for the 
regulatory scheme raised by the Somers and by the Solicitor General, 
concluding that the regulatory scheme is not destroyed if Dodd-Frank 
 
430. Id. at 1051 (Owens, J., dissenting); Berman, 801 F.3d at 159 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). 
431. Berman, 801 F.3d 155 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). 
432. Id. at 159 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). 
433. Id. 
434. Somers, 850 F.3d at 1051 (Owens, J., dissenting). 
435. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 772–73 (2018). 
436. Id. at 776–77. 
437. Id. at 777–78. 
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protection is limited to whistleblowers who make reports to the SEC as well as 
to internal corporate sources.438 
Notably, the Court does not cite King v. Burwell, even where it could, 
declining to become involved in the dispute about its jurisprudential reach.439  
The Court’s decision is rooted in text, informed by purpose, and considers the 
consequential arguments of the parties.440  Concurring opinions debate the 
relevance of the single available piece of relevant legislative history, but 
ultimately only three justices (Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch) would reject that 
source of meaning.441  Thus, the Court does not commit the lower courts to a 
narrow form of textualism. 
The Supreme Court made similar move in another 2018 opinion by Justice 
Ginsburg, this time for an 8-0 majority.442  The Court reviewed the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Guido v. Mount Lemon Fire District.443  In Guido, a Ninth 
Circuit panel decision authored by Judge O’Scannlain creates a split with the 
sixth, seventh, eighth and tenth circuits by holding that the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act’s twenty-employee minimum does not apply to state and 
local government employers.444  The Ninth Circuit relied on a plain-language 
reading of the text: in a two-pronged statutory provision defining a term 
“employer” for purposes of the Act, the twenty-employee minimum clearly 
applies to a “person in an industry affecting commerce,” but does not appear in 
 
438. Id. at 778–82.  An analysis of these consequentialist arguments is beyond the scope of the 
current discussion as it is not necessary to understand the Court’s statutory construction moves. 
439. See generally id. 
440. Id. at 776–82. 
441. Id. at 782 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 783–84 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgement).  The Supreme Court has reversed two additional cases that cite King.  
Stapleton v. Advocate Health Care Network, 817 F.3d 517 (7th Cir. 2016), rev’d, Advocate Health 
Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652 (2017); SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality 
Baby Prods., LLC, 807 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 954 (2017).  Both cases 
cite King for unremarkable propositions, and neither addresses conflicts between purpose and text.  
Stapleton, 817 F.3d at 526 (“Our duty, after all, is to construe statutes, not isolated provisions.”); SCA 
Hygiene, 807 F.3d at 1336 (Hughes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part ) (“It is a fundamental 
canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view 
to their place in the overall statutory scheme.”).  In both cases, as to the statutory interpretation issues, 
the Supreme Court appears to simply disagree on the meaning of less-than-clear statutory text. 
Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. at 1658–62; SCA Hygiene, 137 S. Ct. at 962–63.  Neither case has clear signaling 
value on the question of how courts should reconcile text and purpose. 
442. Mount Lemmon Fire Dist. v. Guido, 139 S. Ct. 22 (2018). 
443. 859 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 1165 (2018).  
444. Id. at 1172–74. 
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a second sentence which provides that the term employer “also means” a state 
or local government.445  The Ninth Circuit cited King for the notion that its 
reading “certainly does not threaten to destroy the entire statutory scheme.”446  
The court rejected purposive and legislative-history based arguments that 
counseled a contrary result.447  
The Supreme Court, per Justice Ginsburg, affirmed the Ninth Circuit, 
relying heavily on textualist reasoning, but also taking a broad look at how 
similar remedial civil rights statutes treat the same issue.448  Again, the Court 
does not cite King for any reason.  The Court does compare the ADEA to Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) and to the Fair Labor Standards 
Act (FLSA).449  Title VII imposes a textually-clear numerosity requirement on 
public employers; FLSA is equally clear, according to the Court, that it applies 
to all governmental employers regardless of their size.450  The Court is not 
troubled that its decision renders the reach of the ADEA broader than Title VII 
because “this disparity is a consequence of the different language Congress 
chose to employ,” and because the FLSA, which served as a model for the 
ADEA is a “better comparator.”451  The Court’s decision, while textual, is also 
deeply intertextual. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The text-vs.-purpose debate in statutory interpretation has been called 
“boring” by a very prominent academic and judge.452  And indeed in its simplest 
form, it is.  However, the real day-to-day work of courts is considerably more 
complex than caricatures of Holy Trinity or “[w]ords no longer have meaning” 
would suggest.453  Understanding how courts use purpose and what evidence 
supports that use involves a close look at what courts actually do.  This paper 
attempts to begin that process by looking at a discrete set of cases likely to 
provide strong evidence of the use of purpose.  While further investigation is 
necessary to assess the impact of Donald Trump’s appointments to the 
judiciary, it seems clear at the present moment that the use of purpose is alive 
 
445. Id. at 1170. 
446. Id. at 1174 (citing King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2495 (2015)). 
447. Id. at 1174–75.  
448. Mount Lemmon Fire Dist. v. Guido, 139 S. Ct. 22, 25–27 (2018). 
449. Id. at 25–26.  
450. Id.  
451. Id. at 26. 
452. Gluck & Posner, supra note 16, at 1300. 
453. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2497 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
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and well in statutory interpretation and is likely to remain so.  Further, the 
judicial role at the court of appeals level has not eroded into ideological battles 
or, worse yet, sloganeering.  Instead, in the vast majority of cases studied here, 
the courts behave as courts, using all the tools available, to greater or lesser 
degrees, to give statutes their fullest and best meaning.  
